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GL~ :a:~· 35 Orig. 
~--sNITED ST~TES 
~ 
Report of Special Master 
(Honorable Albert B. Maris) 
v. 
d:~ 
~ MAINE, NEW HAMFSHIRE, 
; Q MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL. 
~~ 
~ rv 1. In 1969, the Court granted the This is the Atlantic coast boundary case. 
United States leave to file a complaint against the Atlantic coastal states to resolve 
respective claims to the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil of that portion 
of the continental shelf underlying the Atlantic Ocean. 395 U.S. 955. The Report 
of the Special Master., following the holdings of this Court in United States v. Californi a, 
332 u.S. 19 (1947); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950) 1 and United States 
v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950), concludes that with the exception of the seabed and 
( 
subsoil deeded the states by the Submerged Lands Act of 19 53~ the United States is 
entitled as against the defendant states to that portion of the continental shelf lying 
more than three geographical miles seaward from the coastline. 
BACKGROUND: In United States v. California, supra~ the Court held that the 
federal government had 11paramount rights 11 in the three-mile territorial sea along 
the California coast, 11an incident to which is full dominion over ~he resources of 
the soil under that water area.l' including oil. 11 332 U.S. at 39. The Court rejected 
California's argument that since the 13 original states had acquired from the English 
Crown ownership of all lands under the sea within at least three miles of their 
respective coasts, California was entitled to stand on an equal footing with respect 
to the three-mile marginal sea off its coast. The Court found that the equal footing 
doctrine did not support California's claim because the 13 original states had not 
themselves acquired as colonies and did not separately own the three-mile belt or 
the seabed of the adjacent territorial sea. 332 U.S. at 31-34. In United States v. 
Louisiana, supra, and United States v. Texas, supra, the Court followed and applied 
the rule of the California case.l' stating in Louisiana: 
If, as we held in California 1 s case, the three-mile 
belt is in the domain of the Nation rather than that of 
the separate States, it follows a fortiori that the 
ocean beyond that limit also is. The ocean seaward 
of the marginal belt is perhaps even more directly 
related to the national defense, the conduct of foreign 
affairs3 and world commerce than is the marginal 
sea. Certainly it is not less so. 339 U.S. 705-706. 
Subsequent to the Court's decisions in these cases, Congress passed the Sub-
merged Lands Act of 19 53o The Act relinquished to the coastal states all rights of 
the United States to lands within three geographical miles of their coastline. Sub-
sequently, the United States attempted to clarify ownership of submerged land 
resources in the Gulf of Mexico by instituting suit against the five Gulf Coast states. 
( 
( '----' 
See United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960). (The Florida and Louis iana Gulf 
boundaries are still in litigation. No. 52 Orig, see Summer List 18, and Ko . 9 Orig, 
see Summer List 15, Sheet 4.) In 1969, the United States filed the present a c tio n , 
asserting that the defendant states claim some right, title or interest adverse to the 
United States in the continental shelf more than three geographical miles sea ward 
from their respective coastlines, that Maine has purported to grant exclusiv e oil 
and gas exploration and exploitation rights in approximately 3, 3001 000 acres of 
seabed in the area in controversy and that the defendant states are interfering with 
and obstructing the exploration, leasing and development of those mineral resources 
by the United States and will continue to do so, unless the rights of the United States 
are declared and established by this Court.>:< The complaint seeks a declaratory 
decree and a direction for an accounting for money derived by the defendant states 
from the area owned by the United States. 
All of the defendant states filed answers, asserting by way of affirmative defense 
that as successors in title to certain grantees of the Crown of England (and, in the 
case of New York, also of the Crown of Holland) they are entitled to exercise dominion 
and control over the exploration and development of such natural resources as may 
be found in, on or about the seabed and subsoil underlying the Atlantic Ocean adjacent 
>!<President Truman1 s Proclamation of September 28, 1945, 59 Stat. 884, first 
claimed for the United States jurisdiction and control over the natural resources of 
the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf contiguous to the coasts of the United 
States. It opened a new chapter in the international law applicable to this area. For 
it, and the Convention on the Continental Shelf, in force June 10, 1964, 15 U.S. T. 
Pt. 1, p. 471, which followed it, assured to each coastal nation the exclusiv e ri ght 
to explore and exploit the resources of the seabed and subsoil of the adjacent conti-
nental shelf beyond the territorial sea regardless of whether or not the nation had 
actually occupied or exploited the seabed and subsoil, the resources of which it claime C.. 
In the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of August 7, 1953, 67 Stat. 4 6 2, 4 6 8, 
Congress declared "the urgent need for further exploration and development o f the oil 
and gas deposits of the submerged lands of the outer Continental Shelf" and to that end 
provided for the issuance of mineral leases in that area by the Secretary of the Interio r 
to private operators. 
to their respective coastlines to the exclusion of any other political entity \-r.-hatsoever 1 
including the United States, subject only to the limits of national seaward jurisdiction . ' 
established by the United States, that their power· to exercise such dominio n and con-
trol is not prohibited by the Constitution and has never been delegated to the United 
States, and that any attempt by the United States to assert such powe r with respect 
to the defendant states violates the Tenth Amendment and is void. Additio nal defense s 
are asserted by Rhode Island, North Carolina and Georgia. 
In 19701 the United States filed a motion for judgment on the ground that there 
is in the litigation no genuine is sue as to any material fact. The states opposed, 
submitting that the preferable course would be to refer the case to a master. The 
Court did not rule on the motion for judgment, but in June 1970, appointed Judge Mar is 
Special Master and referred the case to him. 398 U.S. 94 7. 
Conferen ces and hearings before the Special Master were held through January, 
19731 the transcript of which totals 21 800 pages. Because Florida1 s case presented 
questions novel to the other states 1 including the resolution of Florida1 s Gulf Coast 
boundaries 1 the Special Master recommended and this Court granted a sev erance. 
(Exceptions and briefs have been filed to Judge Maris 1 report in the Florida proceed-
ing. United States v. Florida-» Orig 52, Summer List 181 Sheet 2.) 
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER: The Special Master defines the basic 
question involved in this litigation as: 
[W]hether the right to explore and exploit the natural 
resources of the seabed and subsoil of that portion of 
the continental shelf underlying the Atlantic Ocean 
which is more than three geographical miles seaward 
from the coastline of the United States belongs to the 
United States or to the defendant States or any of them. 
,___.J The Special Master first considers the outstanding motion of the United States for 
judgment, assuming that the referral of the case to hi1n was not intended to be a 
denial of the motion, but rather as an indica tion of the Court1 s desire for a full 
development of and report on the facts in the ligh~ of which to consider the issues 
involved. Reviewing this Court1 s holdings in the ·California, Louisiana, and Texas 
cases, the Special Master rejects the states 1 argument that these decisions haye been 
repudiated by Congress and by subsequent decisions of the Court and concludes that 
the rule announced in those cases and later "approved and declar.ed to be applicable 
to all coastal states by the second Louisiana case 363 U.S. 1 1 ?, remains in full 
vigor and applies to all the defendant States in this proceeding, foreclosing the issues 
of fact raised by them and requiring as a matter of law the entry of judgment for the 
United States on its motion. 11 
In a lengthy discussion which reflects on the validity of this Court1 s previous 
holdings, the Special Master traces the development of international law on the 
I 
(\_-
claim of coastal states to sovereignty of adjacent seas and, reject.ing the historical 
and constitutional arguments raised by the defendant states, sets forth his conclusions 
in part D of the Report. Among the 32 conclusions reached by the Special Master 
are: (12) the charters of the original colonies did not grant maritime sovereignty or 
dominion over a territorial sea, a concept then unknown, or property rights in the 
seabed or its resources; (15) Colonial law and practice prior to 1776 do not support 
the claim that property rights to the seabed of the marginal sea seaward for 100 
miles or any lesser distance had been granted to the colonies or that such rights 
were exercised by them except in a few cases where portions of the seabed within 
the three -mile limit were actually occupied; (1 7). from and after the date of indepen-
dence, the United States constituted a union of internally independent states with a 
national government to which were delegated certain powers including the powers 
associated with external sovereignty such as the conduct of foreign relations, of 
··, 
defense and of foreign commerce; (19) if the states had any rights to sovereignty 
of the marginal sea and ownership of the seabed off their coasts which they had 
received in any manner~ which the Special Master does not find that they did have, 
those rights would have been lost to the national government upon their ratification 
of the Constitution; (21) the preponderance of the evidence confirms the historical 
findings made in the California case; (22) prior to the Proclamat~on of President 
Truman in 19451 rights to the resources of the seabed beyond territorial waters 
could be obtained only on the basis of prescription or actual occupation and neither 
the United States nor the defendant States had made any such claim; (23) the Procla-
mation for the first time claimed for the United States jurisdiction and control over 
the natural resources of the continental shelf beyond the three-mile limit of the 
territorial sea and (24) this claim was validly made by and on behalf of the United 
States under its powers of external sovereignty and did not enure to the individual 
benefit o_f any of the coastal states. 
The Spe·cial Master also found that it does not appear that any exploration or 
exploitation has been carried on by the licensee of Maine or that any payments have 
been made by it to that state1 and that an accounting is not required. The Special 
Master has appended a recommended decree. 
DISCUSSION: I would note that although several of the defendant states appeared 
as amici in the California case~ they have not yet had their day in Court on the issues 
presented here. 
The Report of the Special Master should be · ordered filed and the parties ordered 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES MICHAEL RODAK. .IR .. Cl£11 
·. 
OCTOBER TERM, 1974 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF, 
v. 
STATE OF MAINE, ET AL., DEFENDANTS. 
. lniV 
Jc~J.r%~~ 
¥ wi~L b4 v.>~ 
MOTION TO ALLOCATE FOUR HOURS 
FOR ARGUMENT 
-fj(r\}., faY~ . ..J 
r(01J~r;~~ The twelve defendant States respectfully move 
~~~~~ the Court to allocate four hours for argument, with two 
to 
;;_hfl..· 
hours to be allocated to the plaintiff and two hours to 
the defendants. 
This action places at issue for the first time 
the momentous question of ownership, as between the States 
and the Federal Government, of the resources of the outer 
continental shelf in the Atlantic Ocean. It is one of the 
most important cases to come before this Court in many 
years, in terms of the magnitude both of the practical 
interests at stake and of the legal principles involved. 
This case will determine ownership of the resources 
of the entire outer continental shelf from Maine to Georgia, 
inclusive, from the three-mile limit out to 100 miles or 
more into the sea, comprising a submarine area of more than 
125,000 square miles, an area larger than the British Isles. 
The value of the economic resources at stake has been 
estimated in the trillions of dollars. 
The present case presents extraordinarily complex 
issues of fact and law. It requires decision of several 
- 2 -
constitutional issues of great moment. It also requires a 
close examination of the development of legal theory, and 
the evolution of state practice, regarding continental-shelf 
resources in England and this country, and internationally, 
c:.J"' rJ 1 l ,. 
over more than four centuries. For-these -reasons the Court 
referred the case to a Special Master, before whom extensive 
evidentiary hearings were held and an exhaustive record com-
piled. 
The proceedings before the Special Master evoked 
sharp conflicts on a most unusual range and variety of factual, 
legal and constitutional issues. The Master's Report, compris-
ing 88 printed pages, made extensive findings and conclusions. 
The States have excepted from these findings and conclusions, 
and are convinced that the Master's approach was basically 
and massively in error and cannot be sustained. 
Since this case is within the Court's original 
jurisdiction, the Court is, of course, the trier of fact as 
well as law. In this extraordinary case, even more than in 
the usual original-jurisdiction case, "this Court has the duty 
of making an independent examination of the evidence." Georgia 
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 470 (1945) (Stone, C.J. 
dissenting) . 
While nine of the defendant States are represented 
by c on Counsel, they desire (if scheduling problems can 
~ 
be overcome) to present argument by the Attorney General of 
*I 
one of themselves as well as by Common Counsel.- One or 
--
*! The Common Counsel States are Delaware, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode 
Island and Virginia. North Carolina, South Carolina and 
Georgia are separately represented, but have joined in this 
Motion. ' 
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more of the three States not represented by Common Counsel, 
some of which have special defenses, may wish to argue 
separately. 
The time allowed in No. 35, Original, should not 
be limited because of the pendency of two other "tidelands" 
cases. No. 9, Original, United States v. Louisiana, differs 
fundamentally from the present case since it involves com-
paratively technical questions relating to the precise 
location of boundary lines in the Gulf. No. 52, Original, 
United States v. Florida, is related to the present case 
insofar as any decision in favor of the defendant States in 
the present case would also redound to the benefit of Florida; 
but, while No. 52, Original, cannot be conclusively resolved 
before decision in the present case, the broad common issues 
of state ownership of the Atlantic Coast seabed beyond three 
miles are presented for argument solely in the present case. 
This Court has generally accommodated the scheduling 
of time for oral argument to allow such extra time as might be 
necessary for a full presentation where issues of great com-
plexity and moment are involved. Only recently, the Court 
allowed three hours for oral argument in the Regional Rail 
Reorganization Act Cases, No. 74-165, et al., decided on 
December 16, 1974, 43 U.S.L. Wk. 4031. The present litigation 
is in no way less important and, in its historical factual 
evidence, vastly more complicated and difficult to present. 
The defendant States submit that ample time for 
argument is required if the Court is to explore the issues 
sufficiently to do justice in this case. The States believe 
that four hours are necessary for that purpose. They so 
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advised the Court by letter to the Clerk dated October 2, 
1974. They now renew that advice and that request by 
Motion. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Andrew P. Miller 
Attorney General of Virginia 
Gerald L. Baliles 
Deputy Attorney General 
Supreme Court Library Building 
Richmond, Virginia 23219 
Richard W. Wier, Jr. 
Attorney General of Delaware 
Charles Brandt 
Assistant Attorney General 
Wilmington Tower 
12th & Market Street 
Wilmington, Delaware 19801 
Joseph Brennan 
Attorney General of Maine 
Donald G. Alexander 
As~istant Attorney General 
State House 
Augusta, Maine 04330 
Francis B. Burch 
Attorney General of Maryland 
Henry R. Lord 
Deputy Attorney General 
One South Calvert Street 
Baltimore, Maryland 21202 
Franci X. Bellotti 
Attorney General of Massachusetts 
Robert M. Bonin 
First Assistant Attorney General 
State House 
Boston, Massachusetts 02133 
Warren B. Rudman 
Attorney General of New Hampshire 
David H. Souter 
Deputy Attorney General 
State House Annex 
Concord, New Hampshire 03301 
William F. Hyland 
Attorney General of New Jersey 
Elias Abelson 
' Assistant Attorney General 
198 West State Street 
Trenton, New Jersey 08608 
• 
• 
January 22, 1975 
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Louis J. Lefkowitz 
Attorney General of New York 
Joseph T. Hopkins 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
Julius C. Michaelson 
Attorney General of Rhode Island 
Providence County Court House 
Providence, Rhode Island 02903 
Rufus Edmisten 
Attorney General of North Carolina 
Jean A. Benoy 
Deputy Attorney General 
Department of Justice Building 
Box 629 
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 
Daniel R. McLeod 
Attorney General of South Carolina 
Edward B. Latimer 
Assistant Attorney General 
Hampton Office Building 
Columbia, South Carolina 29201 
Arthur K. Bolton 
Attorney General of Georgia 
Alfred L. Evans, Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
132 State Judicial Building 
Atlanta, Georgia 30334 
Brice M. Clagett 
Michael Boudin 
Covington & Burling 
888 Sixteenth Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006 
Attorneys for the States of Delaware, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Rhode Island and Virginia 
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No. 35 Orig. 
UNITED STATES 
v. 
MAINE, NEW HAMPSHIRE, 
MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL. 
Exceptions to Report of 
Special Master and Replies 
Thereto 
This is the Atlantic coast boundary case in which the Special 
Master, following the holdings of United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 
(1947); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950), and Unit ed Stat e s 
v. Texa.s, 339 U.S. 707 (1950), concludes that with the exception of the 
sea bed and sub sail deeded the states by the Submerged Lands Act of 195 3, 
the United States is entitled as against the defendant states to that portion 
of the continental shelf lying more than three geographical miles seaward 
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of the coastline. The Report was ordered filed and exceptions and replies 
thereto called for on October 15. 
Exceptions have been taken by the defendant States and extensive 
briefs have been filed. The United States filed its reply brief Tuesday, 
January 21. I have not been able to prepare a memorandum summarizing 
the litigation. I will circulate a memorandum next week. 
There would seem little question, however, but that the case should 
be set for oral argument. Setting the case for argument at this Conference 
would provide the parties sufficient time to prepare for argument in 
February. The Clerk tentatively plans to set the case for argument the 
second argument week in February, together with United States v. Louisiana, 
No. 9 Orig., and United States v. Florida, No. 52 Orig. 
There is a reply brief by the SG. 
l/23/75 
DK 
Ginty Report filed 
... Conference 1-24-75 
Court ....... . ........... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. 35 Orig. 
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No o 35 O rig. 
UNI T ED STATES 
v. 
MAINE, NEW HAMPSHIRE 
MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL. 
Exception to Report of 
Special Master and 
Reply Thereto 
1. This case involves the claim of 12 of the 13 Atlantic coast states (Florida is 
proceeding separately in No. 52 Orig.) to the natural resources of the continental 
shelf adjacent to their respective coastlines. Citing United States v. California, 
332 U.S. 19 (1947); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950), and United 
3:_/I was unable to prepare a memorandum summarizing the litigation in this 
c ase in time for the January 24 Conference. The present memorandum is sub-
mitted for whatever assistance it might provide in preparing for argmnent. 
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States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950), the Special Master has concL:ded that wit!: 
the exception of the seabed deeded the States by the Submerged Lanes Act of 193 3, 
43 U.S. C . 1301 et seq, the United States is entitled as against the cefendant Stat e: 
to that portion of the continental shelf lying more than three geogra?:'"lical miles 
seaward of the coastline. 
The defendant States have filed exceptions to virtually all the Special Master's 
~
principle proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. ::-.Jorth Carolina, South 
Carolina and Georgia have filed a separate brief and except specifi cally to 29 of 
the Master's 32 delineated conclusions, 22 as being contrary to the evidence; 4 
as being irrelevant; and 3 on the ground that they are contrary to the law and the 
evidence. The remaining States, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island and Virginia, are repre-
sented by c ommon counsel and except to the report of the Master in a more 
general manner. They identify 15 issues on which they take exception. The -
United States has filed no exceptions, but has submitted a brief in response to 
the defendant State s 1 briefs in support of their exceptions. 
Four hours have been granted the parties for oral argument, and the case 
presently is scheduled to be called Monday afternoon, February 24. 
BACKGROUND: In United States v. California, the Court held that the federa 
government had ttparamount rights 11 in the three-mile belt of territorial sea 
adjacent to the California coast, nan incident to which is full dominion over the 
resources of the soil under that water area, including oil. n 332 U.S. at 38-39. 
The Court rejected California's argument that since the 13 original states had acquire 
from the English Crown title to the land under the sea within at least three miles o f 
their coasts, California was entitled to stand on an 11 equal footing 11 \vith respect to 
the three-mile marginal sea off its coast. The Court found that the equal footing 
doctrine did not support California's claim because ~~it could not be iound] that the 
•' 
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thirteen original colonies separately acquired ownership to the three-mile b elt or 
the soil under it, even if they did acquire elements of the sovereignty of the E n g li s l': . 
Crown by their rev olution against it. 11 332 at 31. In United States v. Louis i ana a nC. 
United States v. Texas, the Court followed and applied t h e rule of Californi c:., stati:l£ 
in Louisiana: 
As we pointed out in United States v . Califor nia, the 
issue in this class of litigation does not turn on title 
or owner ship in the conventional sense. <;aliiornia, 
like the thir~I?-~.!.i:J~.~- ies, never ac3:..ui~d 
owner ship in the marginal sea. The claim to our 
t~~asfi?sraSserted by the nati onal 
goverrunent. Protection and control of [the m arginal 
sea] are ••• functions of national external so,·ereignty 
• • • • The marginal sea is a national, not a state 
concern. National inter ests, nati~.;al responsibilities, 
nit1onal concerns are involved. The problems of 
commerce, national defense, relations with other 
powers, war and peace focus there. National rights 
must therefore be paramount in that area. 
* * 
} 
If, as we held in California1 s case, the three-mile 
belt is in the domain of the Nation rather than that 
of the separate states, it follows~ fortiori t h at the 
ocean beyond that limit also is. The ocean seaward 
of the marginal belt is perhaps even more directly 
I 
related to . the national defense, the conduct o f foreign 
affairs, and world commerce than is the mar gina! 
sea. Certainly it is not less so. 339 U.S. 704, 
70 5-06. 
Subsequent to the Court1 s decisions in these cases, Congress passed the 
Submerged Lands Act of 1953. The Act relinquished to th e coastal states a ll righ: s 
of the United States to lands within three geographical n"li les of their coas tli ne. S·.:·::> -
sequently, the United States sought to clarify ownership o f submerged lane resou r c es 
in the Gulf of Mexico by instituting suit against the five Gulf Coast states. See "l· r:.:.t e d 
States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960). (The Florida, ~o. 52 Orig., and Lou is ia a a, 
No. 9 Orig. 1 cases which also are to be argued this month represent the e nd o f t l: e 
Gulf Coast litigation.) In 1969, the United States filed the present action, asser t:::tg 
that the defendant States claim some right, title or interest adverse to th e Cnit ed 
( '--' 
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St a t es in t h e continental shelf more than three geographical miles seawarc f rom their 
r espective coastlines, that Maine has purported to grant exclus ive oil anc gas e>..'Plora-
tion and exploration rights in approximately 3, 300,000 acres o f seabed i n t h e area in 
c ontrover s y and that the defendant States are interfering with a::1d obstr u ct i ng the ex-
p lo r a tion., leasing and development of those mineral resources '::>y the United States a nd 
will continue to do so., unless the rights of the United States are declare d and establishe 
-·-b y the Court. .,. The complaint seeks a declaratory decree and a direction for an 
a c c ount i ng for money derived by the defendant States from the area owned by the Unite ci. 
States. 
All of t h e defendant States filed answers, asserti ng by way of affir rr.ative defens e 
that as successors in title to certain grantees of the Crown of England, t~ey are 
e ntitled to exercise dominion and control over the exploration and development of 
such natural resources as may be found in, on or about the sea'::>ed and s u bsoil under-
l y ing the Atlantic Ocean adjacent to their respective coastlines to the exclusion of 
a n y o th~ r political entity, subject only to the limits of national seaward ju risdiction 
e s tabli she d by the United States, that their power to exercise such domi nion and cont rc 
i s not prohibited by the Constitution and has never been delega t ed to the C nited States, 
.:_/President Truman's Proclamation of September 28, 1 9 ~ 5 claime c for the United 
State s jurisdiction and control over the natural resources of t~ e subsoil and seabed of 
the c ontinental shelf contiguous to the coasts of the United Sta t es. Exec. Proc. 26 61, 
Sept. 28, 1 945, 10 FR 12303. See also Convention on the Co nti nental s :::e lf, in force 
J une 10, 1964, 15 U.S. T. Pt. 1, p. 471, which assured to eac h coasta l :1ation the 
exclusive right to explore and exploit the resources of the ad_i acent cont:. :1ental shelf 
beyond the territorial sea regardless of whether or not the na t ion had ac tually 
occupied or expl9ited the seabed and subsoil. 
In the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of August 7, 19 53 , 43 U.S. C. 1331, ~ se 
C ongress declared 11the urgent need for further exploration a nd developr.: ent of the 
oil and gas deposits of the submerged lands of the ou ter Conti :1ental She l:· • and to 
t hat e nd provided for the issuance o f n>ineral leases by the Se c retary a: th e Interior. 
'-• i 
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and that any attempt by the United States to assert such power with respect to the 
· defendant States violates the 1Oth Amendment and is ·Void. Additional defe:1se s were 
asserted by Rhode Island, North Carolina and Georgia, but these appear to ::a,·e been 
abandoned on review here. 
In 1970, the United States moved for judgment on the pleadings, conte::1.C.ing that 
there is no is sue as to any material fact involved in the litigation. The States oppo se c. 
submitting that the preferable course would be to refer the case to a master. Without 
specifically ruling on the motion of the United States, the Court appointed Jt.:.dge Alber: 
Maris Special Master and referred the case to him. 398 U.S. 947. 
Because Florida raised defenses novel to the other States':' and because of Florid:: 
pending Gulf coast litigation, the Master recommended and this Court granted Flo ride. 
a severance. 403 U.S. 949, 950. Florida1 s case is before the Court in :\"o. 52 Orig. 
and will be argued in tandem with this case. 
Conferences and hearings before the Special Master were held thro ugh January 
1973, the transcript of which totals 2, 800 pages. The Report of the Special ::\1a ster 
was ordered filed and exception and reply briefs called for an October 15, 1 974. The 
brief of North Carolina _e t al totals 83 pages, plus 149 pages of appendices. Delaware 
.et al, the 11 Common Counsel States," have filed a 140 -page brief, a 48 5 -page 11 supple· 
mental brief, 11 and three volumes of appendices totaling more than 1, 000 pages. The 
SG has filed a 59-page reply brief. Amicus briefs have been filed by the Special 
Committee on Tidelands of the National Association of Attorneys General a::J.d by the 
Associated Gas Distributors. 
REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER EXCEPTIONS AND CONTE~TIO:\"S: 
A. The Special Master first considers the outstanding motion of the L:ni ted State : 
'---" for judgment. He assumes that the referral of the case to him was not inte::1.ded to be 
':'/Florida claims that upon its readmission into the Union, Congress a:mroved t::. 
marine boundaries of the State as described in its Constitution of 1 S68 , ,,·::-:ich bounda 
ries, it argues, run more than three miles seaward of its coast in certa :.::J. parts o f 
the Atlantic • 
• l' ,."" 
.'--...-
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a denial of the motion, but an indication of the Court1 s desire for a full development 
of and report on the facts in which to consider the issues. The Master then reviews 
this Court1 s holdings in California, Louisiana and Texas. He rejects the States 1 ar gu -
ment that these decisions have been repudiated by Congress in the Submerged Lands 
Act and by subsequent decisions of the Court. He cites the following language of the 
Court in Louisiana II: 
Since [the Submerged Lands Act] concededly did not 
impair the validity of the California, Louisiana, and 
Texas cases, which are admittedly applicable to all 
coastal states, this case draws i n question only. 
363 U.S. at 7. 
and concludes that the rule announced in Cal ifornia, Louisiana and Texas and later 
"approved and declared to be applicable to all coastal states in the second Louisiana 
case 363 U.S. 1, 7, remains in full vigor and applies to all the defendant States in 
this proceeding, foreclosing the issues of fact raised by them and requiring as a 
matter of law the entry of judgment for the 'l"nited States on its motion. 11 
Th~ defendant States ':' contend that the issues raised here are in no way foreclosed 
by California. First, they argue principles relative to the doctrine of res judicata: 
that the Court has never previously adjudicated the rights of the States to the Atlantic 
seabed, that none of the defendant States ,,.as a party to the Cali fornia litigation, and 
that it is well settled that a stranger to litigation is not concluded by its resolution 
of either factual or legal issues. Second, t h e states argue that the Master misreads 
California in imputing to it a constitutional doctrine making federal owner ship a 
necessary adjunct to federal foreign-affairs and defense powers. They note the 
Court• s reference to "equal footing 11 principles in defeating Texa s 1 claims in the 
.:_/The exceptions and arguments of Korth Carolina et al and the Common Counse l 
States do not appear to be significantly di f: erent and are not treated separately unless 
otherwise noted. This is the approach taken by the SG who appears to focus on the 
brief of the Common Counsel States. 
\....__, 
Texas case and cite the Court1 s opinion upholding the Submerged Lanas ACt, .tna:oama ". 
Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954), and the subsequent confirmation of the claims of Florida 
and Texas to three leagues in the Gulf under the historical standard established by the 
Act. Louisiana II, 363 U.S. 1 (1960); United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960). 
The States reason that either California did not rest on any ground of necessary federal 
ownership or that that ground has been reconsidered and rejected sub silentio. They 
then go on to argue that such a doctrine is in any event unsound in view of the federal 
government's preemptive power which would override any state action that would create 
international problems, interfere with foreign policy etc. [See Justice Reed 1 s dis sent 
;>owefl ~ • 
in California regarding the federal government1 s plenary" 332 U.S. at 42-43.] and 
that any such 11inseparability11 concept was repudiated by Congress in the Submerged 
Lands Act in granting the States the three-mile territorial sea and by this Court in 
Louisiana II and Florida. Thirdly, the States maintain that California--because of the 
nature of the equal-footing claims advanced- -focused on whether there existed a uni-
form three-mile belt in the 18th century and did not find as a historical fact that the 
Atlantic States did not own the resources of the seabed along their coasts. Also, the 
States contend that the ruling in California derived from a lack of evidence, that it is 
not a definitive historical finding, and that the States have here produced massive 
evidence~ in support of their historic claims. Lastly, the defendant States argue 
that their historic claims are supported by a presumption of validity in that under the 
Constitution, the States are residual owners of property and that the common under-
standing for a century and a half was that the States owned the submerged lands 
adjacent to their coasts. See Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. _240 ( 1891 ); 
Pollard1 s Lessee v. Hogan, 44 U.S. ( 3 How.) 212 ( 1845 ); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 
' (16 Pet.) 367 (1842). 
The United States notes that the Master considered the States1 arguments barred 
not by the doctrine of res judicata but by that of stare decisis. The SG questions 
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whether the State s 1 assertion that the historical record was inadequat ely presented 
i n t he California, even if true, would warrant a departure from the doctrine of stare 
d e ci s i s i n v iew of the substantial reliance that Congress, the states, and the federa : 
gove r nment have placed upon that decision. He then ar gues that the States m i sread 
th e Master's report in imputing to him a reading of t h e California dec i sion as resti::~ 
upon a pr e sumed inseparability of foreign-affairs and defense powers with owners l:.:.:_:: 
of seabed resources. The United States points out t hat the significa:1ce of federal 
foreign-affairs and defense powers in California was two-fold: (1) t r. e United States 
o riginally had acquired dominion and control over the territorial sea through the 
exercise of those powers, and (2) the degree to whic h the territoria l sea is a ffecte C. 
by those powers made it inappropriate for the Court, as the explica t or of constitu-
tional doctrine, to extend the Pollard rule of state reparian owners h.:.p of inland wa: e rs 
11out into the soil beneath the ocean •••• 11 332 U.S. at 36. Moreoy er, the SG ur ges , 
the b asis of the California decision was reconfirmed rather than repudiated by the 
' 
Subm erged Lands Act by which 11the United States relinquished to t h e coastal States 
a ll of its rights in such lands within certain geographi cal limits, and confirmed it s 
ow n rights therein beyond those limits. 11 Louisiana II , 363 U.S. at 6 -7. The SG a : :: o 
notes that Congress expressly asserted federal ownership o f the na tu ral resources ;:): 
t h e s eabed of the Atlantic Ocean seaward of the terr i torial sea in t l: e Outer Contir:e :::al 
She lf Lands Act and in doing so necessarily relied u pon the Califor .::.:. a decision. :- :-.e 
SG contends that the finding in Cali fornia that the Atlantic coast sta :e s, and their 
predecessor colonies, had no owner ship interest in the seabed adj a c ent to their s :-.a ::-e ~ 
was integral to the Court1 s conclusion that Californi a was not ent i t l ed to its cl airr.:: 
u nder the equal footing doctrine. And, he notes, that the Court ex-tended this pri::c:.?l• 
r \ of f ederal ownership beyond the three-mile belt in Louisiana. Las t l y , the United S:c.t' 
m aintains that the historical ~oldings of California w ere based not upon a lack o f 
evidence as suggested by the States, but rather upon a "multitude o f references ' ' a:--c 
a "wealth of material, 11 332 U.S. at 31, and further notes the observation by the 
Special Master here that "many of the historical documents, although admittedly not 
all, which have been introduced as exhibits .•• were before [the Court] in the California 
case. 11 The SG argues that the additional evidence submitted by the States is largely 
cumulative and contributes little to the body of historical knowledge that was before 
the Court in California. He also notes that Massachusetts, New York and New Jersey 
participated in California as amici curiae. 
B. Although holding the State s 1 claims foreclosed by California, the Special 
Master nevertheless reviewed and weighed the evidence and arguments concerning 
the his toric basis of the California decision. In a lengthy discussion which reflects 
on the validity of this Court's previous holdings, the Master traces the development 
of international law on the claim of the coastal states to sovereignty of adjacent seas 
and, rejecting the historical and constitutional arguments raised by the States, sets 
forth his c onclusions in part D of the Report. In particular, the Master found ( 1) that 
at the time of the American Revolution, British law did not recognize a sovereign right 
to ownership of the seabed of the outer continental shelf; (2) that the English charters 
es tablishing the American colonies did not grant ownership of the seabed; (3) that 
c olonial activities do not support the defendant States' contention that the colonies 
either had been granted or claimed or exercised dominion and control of the seabed 
beyond the three-mile marginal sea; (4) that even if the colonies had, contrary to the 
evidence, been granted or had exercised such dominion and control, their rights 
would have passed to the United States as attributes of external sovereignty at inde-
pendence or upon ratification of the Constitution; and ( 5) that the defendant States did 
not acquire any interest in the seabed of the outer continental shelf subsequent to 
ratification of the Constitution. 
On these historical points the parties argue extensively from an abundance of 
sometimes conflicting evidence. Underlying the States' exceptions to the Master's 
.. ! .: ~ ~. ' 
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-findings is their c ontent i o n that he a pplied an erroneous methodology. The States 
·argue t hat the M a ster depended too much on seco ndary sources, paid rxtrao r dinar y 
defer e nce to o ne such source -Fulton's The Sovere i£ nty of the Sea-and that :-.e tested 
t he evidence and exhibit s"' i nc ludin g primary sour c es of reference, b y wh e t:-.er they 
c oincide d with Fulton's view s. See Report at 25-2 6 . The States argue th a t the 
oppo site approa c h i s the c or r ect one, i.e., that se c ondary sources illlJI:st be t ested 
by the prima r y evidence. F urthe rmore, the States assert, Fulton, a ltho us:<'1 a 
significant source ,, is at va riance with the evidence and with the weight o f s cholar-
shi p on two point s central to th e St a tes 1 c ase: (1) the claim that Englis,h l a v:· prior 
t o 16 0 3 fa iled to recogni ze m ar i time sovereignty and dominion and (2) the cla im that 
the a dmitted 1 7th c entury l egal r ecognition thereof v anished after 16 88. T 1:ey seek 
to discredit F ulto n by noti ng that his treatise was w ritten at the height of p opularity 
of the f reedom - of-the- seas doctrine, a doctrine o f which, the States claim , F ulton 
was a zealous advocate . 
The SG r e plies that the Master's use of Fulto n's text was entirely pro?e r: ( 1) 
that c ontrary t o the State s 1 contention, the Master studied the primary s our ce 
mate r ials and did not rely exclusively upon secondary materials; (2) that F·~1 1ton 
drew upon most, i f not all, of the relevant prima r y evidence introduce b y b e States 
and th e Master was e n t itl ed to compare his own p reliminary understanding of that 
evidence with the v i e ws expressed by Fulton and o thers; and (3) that as the ~faster 
noted, Fulton1 s work i s generally regarded as perh aps the single most a uL: o ritative 
study of pre-ninete enth century English maritime claims, that even the State s' chi ei 
witness, Professor Jessup, praised the Fulton tex t, and that the States' t ::en1selves 
have relied upon Fulton throughout the litigation. 
Addressing the specific historical findings o f the Master: I. The State s argue 
that the evidence massively supports their claim that English law and pra ctice prior 
to the 17th century recognized the sovereignty a nd ownership by the C ro \v!l 
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of the English Seas and the resources thereof. The States argue that the so·.·ereign'::; 
claimed by the Crown was complete territorial sovereignty. They cite~ inter alia, . 
a 14th century statute referring to "the sea or elsewhere within the realm 11 ; the 11£1;:.~ 
.salute11 requiring foreign ships sailing in the claimed English '.Vaters to stri}<e their 
sails to English ships; the Crown1s assertion of and exercise oi the right to grant 
exclusive fisheries in these seas~ including title to sedentary fisheries; the Crown1 .;; 
asserted rights to flotsam, jetsam and lagan; and establish English law, co:J.trary t:: 
Roman law, which held that a new island rising in the claimed seas belongs :o the 
Crown on the theory that the Crown had owned the land while still covered w:..th 
water. 
The United States replies that the States' contentions are based upon a confusic:::. 
between maritime sovereignty and seabed owner ship. As found by the Master, the 
SG contends that the Crown1 s claimed 11 sovereignty 11 over the adjacent seas -;:;·as a 
Jl limited one, that England exercised only a protective jurisdiction for the pt.:rpose c: 
protecting commerce. As evidence that the seas were never considered wit~in the 
realm under British law, the SG cites a 1389 statute which pro\·ided that the admir::- 1 
shall "not meddle from henceforth of anything done within the realm, but only of 
a thing done upon the sea. 11 He argues that this statute, together with other sourc o::: s, 
has long been understood as circumscribing the English realm, in a property-law 
sense~ by inland waters and the low-water line. The SG refutes the States 1 evider:;: e 
of ownership. He contends that the "flag salute" was merely an attribute o: ?rotec:~·.-e 
jurisdiction and that the Crown's prerogative rights to royal fish, flotsam etc. are 
merely examples of the Crown1 s overriding rights in owner-less prope.rty :ound by 
its subjects. He contends that there is no evidence of Crown grants of excbsive 
fisheries after 1215 and that the jurisdiction exercised over fis::U.ng after tl:a t date 
related primarily to inland waters. 
' f 
II. All parties agree that during the Stuart era (1603-1688), the Crown asserted 
general sovereignty over the English seas, including a claim to the ownership of the 
seabed. The parties disagree, however, as to the grounds on which that sove reignty 
rested. The States argue that the Crown's claims were based upon a theory of inherent 
sovereign ownership in the coastal state extending seaward to 100 miles. They rely 
on the writings of commentators of that p eriod and the testimony of their principle 
witness, Professor Jessup. They also cite a 1909 decision of the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration which appears to recognize that maritime territory "is an essential 
appurtenance of land territory. 11 The SG argues, however, that the States1 theory 
has no historical foundation and is refute d by the very extravagance of the Stuart 
claims to the Bay of Biscay and the North Sea, which denied to France, Spain and 
the North Sea nations any corresponding sovereign maritime rights. Noting that the 
Stuart era proved to be the high tide of British maritime pretensions, the SG relies 
on the finding of the Master that the Stuart claims were based upon effective occupa-
tion of the seas through British naval power. He maintains that even during this 
period the adjacent seas were never considered to be within the realm of England. 
He cites a 1876 English case, Regina v. Keyn, in which Lord Chief Justice Cockburn 
demonstrated that the courts of admiralty had never had territorial jurisdiction to 
try a foreigner for a crime committed on a foreign ship on the seas over which 
England claimed "sovereignty. 11 
The parties also disagree as to whether or not t'he Stuart pretensions were 
abandoned during the 18th century. As found by the Master, the United States argues 
that they were. Depreciating the evidence offered by the States to the contrary, the 
SG argues that the "flag salute" had become largely ceremonial and that the evidence 
concerning the regulation of foreign fishing appears to pertain only to inland waters 
or shallow coastal seas. With respect to the latter, the SG notes that Professor Jessup 
has shown that England claimed no exclusive fisheries beyond three miles from 
.~ . 
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shore at the end of the 18th century. And~ in a:1y event, the SG woulC. rely on his 
earlier argument that a claim to exclusive fisr_eries would have been ':lased upon 
appropriation of those fisheries through occupation and use~ not upo:: a theory of 
territorial ownership. The SG notes that Blac::Zstone did recognize t:::e Stuart theory 
of seabed ownership as a possible basis for a Crown claim of owners:-:_i p of emergeC. 
lands, but contends that he was uncertain of tte soundness of that theory. 
III. Noting the above Stuart claims, the C.e£endant States argue :~at given this 
legal and political climate in which the colonia l charters were issueC., it would have 
been 11incredible 11 if the colonies they created :-_ad not been granted sea and seabed 
rights. They argue that in view of the Stuart claims it stands to reason that simila:::-
claims would have been made on this side of t:-:e Atlantic. They rely on the te stimo:1y 
of the expert witnesses, treaties and maps purportedly demonstrati::.g English clair:-_s 
to the marginal seas of the North American colonies. They also note two of the 
c olonial charters 1 the second Virginia charter of 1609 and the New :=:::ngland charter 
of 1620, as conveying "all the Islands lying ..,,·ithin one hundred Miles along the Coast 
. . • Together with all the Soils, Grounds ••• :\,fines .•• as other 1.~:.:-terals .•• wit::.:n 
the said Territories ••• whatsoever 1 and thereto and thereabouts by Sea and Land, 
being, or in any sort belonging or appertaini:1g •••• "and~ with respect to the 
New England colony's boundaries, ''by all the Breadth afore said thr 0ughout the Ma:.::-1 
Land, from Sea to Sea~ with all the Seas, Ri\·ers, Islands, Creeks, Inlets, Forts. 
shall be the Limits and Bounds ••• of the second Colony ••• " and t=:e granting 
language of "Mines, and Minerals ••• both .., .. ,.:.thin the same Trail o: Land upon the 
Main, and also within the said Islands and Seas adjoining. 11 Contra :-v to the conclu-
sion of the Master, the States find the above language explicit enouE;h to convey 
.\ sovereignty and dominion in the colonial seas. They argue that in ~-~ artin v. Wadce ll, 
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842) 7 and Shirley v. Bowbly, 152 U.S. 1-t, 16 (1844), the 
Court expressly relied on the "royalties" language of the charters as including a 
conveyance of the soil under all navigable waters, without making any dis tine tion 
between inland waters and the rnarginal sea. The States go on to cite, inter alia, 
''free fishing" clauses found in some of the charters and maps made in the co lonial 
period showing boundarie s extending out i nto the sea. 
The United States contenc s that Britain paid little or no attention to, and express e::. 
little or no intere st in c laimi:1g sovereignty over, the Arne ric an seas. The SG argues 
that a prope r reading of the c!:arter s shows no explicit grant of the seas or seabed 
but rather that while they gra:1ted lands and islands outright, they granted only certa~:: 
rights short of ownership in t:,.e seas. By contrast, the SG notes that the Ca:1adian 
c olonial charters purported to make outright grants of the sea. He further contends 
that since the charters on which the States rely specifically enumerated many pre-
rogatives, such as fishings a.::1d precious stones, but did not specifically enun1erate 
ownership of the seas o r seabed as a prerogative, such ownership did not pass to 
the colonies. In any event, t~e SG returns to his interpretation that the Stuart clain: 
to sovereign ownership of the seas could be achieved, if at all, only through occupat: o:; 
and use, and argues that there is no evidence of such occupation and use in the area 
of the seas now at issue. He reasons that while limited e'.-i dence of American colon:.c..~ 
fishing is insufficient to establish such a claim, it, in any event, demonstrates only 
an occupation of shallow coastal waters. Finally, the United States contends that 
the colonial charters did not in practice grant proprietary interests; rather, they 
granted opportunities to establish settlements and appropriate lahds, toget!:er with 
sufficient authority to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of thos e 
settlements. Accordingly, the SG contends, any rights to the adjacent seas and sea ·:;.::' 
that passed under the grants and charters did so as incidents of government. And - 1. c::.--
colonial governmental powers had reverted to the Crown before independence. 
IV. The defendant States also except to the Master 1 s finding that if the colonies 
had a claim to the seabed, t h at claim would have passed to the United States at inde-
pendence or upon ratification of the Constitution. The States argue that at inde-
pendence each State became a complete sovereign, recognized as such b:,· both our 
law and by international law. They contend that under the constitutional law of the 
.revolutionary period the United States was not regarded as a separate e::::.ty dis-
tinguished from the States, but rather as the States themselves, acting i:1 confederation 
or concert for the winning of the war. They cite insta:J.ces where the Sta:es were 
individually recognized in treaties, and individually carried on substantia l foreign-
affairs and defense activities. They also argue that Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 
of the Constitution itself refutes any claim that it trans: erred sub silent: o any territor y 
or property from the States to the federal government. Finally, they co::::.tend that 
throughout our history down to the Court's decision in California it was -v:ell under-
stood that under the Constitution the States retained the i r rights in the rr..arginal seas 
and seabed. They here rely principally on Follard1 s Lessee and its progeny. They 
·"'--...-
(, note the Court1 s admission in California that in reasserting the basic doctrine of 
Pollard, the Court had used language strong enough to indicate a belief t~at the states 
not on~y owned tidelands and soil under navigable inland waters, but also owned soils 
under all navigable waters within their territorial jurisdiction, whether :.:1land or not. 
332 U.S. at 36. See Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891 ). 
The United States argues that it was created upon i:J.dependence as c. single nation 
and was recognized as such under international law and, accordingly, a:::.y seabed 
ownership rights previously held either by the Crown or by the colonies would have 
passed to the United States as an incident of external so...-ereignty. The SG argues that 
while the United States has never denied that the States exercised inter:::.c.l s·overeignty 
upon independence, they were never external sovereigns. He argues t:::.c.: the history 
of the Continental Congress shows _that a national government possessir:;.g the attributes 
of sovereignty came into being prior to the states. The SG cites an ear:v decision of 
this Court, Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. (3 Da •• ) 53 (17<?5), as finding t:::at ''the 
states, individually, were no t known nor recognized as sove:-e i gn, by foreign 
nations .••• 11 He also re l.~ es on United States v. Curtiss-·.•;·::- i ght Export C o rp., 
299 U.S. 304 (1936), wher e th e Court found that "[a] sa res :_:2t of the separa ti on 
from Great B ritain ••• the ?Owers of external sov ereignty :;; ::. s sed from the Crown 
no t t o the c o lonies severa ll~.- , but to the colonies in their c o:.~ ec tive and corpo rate 
c a pacity as the United State s of America. 11 And., in any e ve:::, the SG mai n t a i ns t he.: 
such sov ereignty would ha ve passed to the United States up o:: ratification o f t}·_ e 
Cons ti tution in that the Co:: s titution confirmed that the Uni te:: States posses sed all 
a ttributes of external sove :-e i gnty. He contends that Art. r·.-, Sect. 3, Cl. 2 was 
no t i ntended to affect the d : s t ribution of incidents of externc.~ s overeignty, s t.:ch as 
a n inherent sovereign owne ::-ship of the adjacent seas and s e::.·b ed. 
V. The States argue t::-..at the adoption by the United Stc. :e s of a three -mile 
ter ritor i a l sea did not wor ::: a contraction of any existing Stc.:e s 1 rights and t::at 
even if exclusive rights to :be outer continental shelf are d e ~.med to have ar i sen in 
1945 for the first time, the States would be entitled to thos e ri ghts. They ar gue 
t ha t they are entitled to ha·,·e their rights measured by inte ::-.::.a tional law as it exists 
today . And that, in any e ,·ent, an overwhelming preponde r -::..::.c e of authority c onfir=:s 
t hat the three-mile limit related fundamentally to surface r:.::. Yigation and re lated 
right s; and i ts basic ratio .::.c.le could not affect the historic -=~aims of the Sta t es to 
develop the m i neral resou :- c es of the seabed. Repeating H- ~~ r historic ar gur.:: ents , 
the States further maintai.::. that even if rights in the shelf c. ::- .:> se in 1945 for the fir s : 
time, they are unquestiona .;)ly the residual owners of prope::- :·y within their l a::1d 
t er r itor ie s to which the c o.::ti nental- shelf rights are an "irL::.-=- rent" appurtenance. 
Arguing that it is cl e ar that the federal goverrunent c a.::., i n the conduct of th e 
nation's foreign affairs, ac just national territorial bounda r~e s and in doing so ce de 
territory of a state, the S G c~ntends that adoption by the l · ::i t ed States of a three-
mile territorial se.a not oc:-.... y renounced the States preexi s L::og claitns, if any, to t.:-. .:: 
seas and seabed beyond; it also foreclosed any such claims from subsequently 
arising. The SG further argues that the States' contention that the rights created 
by the Truman Proclamation of 1945 vested in them as residual owners of the 
adjacent lands is inconsistent with this Court's constitutional deterrnination in 
.California that, in the absence of proof of val~d historic title in the States, owner-
ship of the seabed of the adjacent seas inheres in the United States as the external 
sovereign. 
VI. Finally., the States claim that at the very least., they are entitled to prove 
historic boundaries out to three leagues on the Same basis as the Gulf States are 
under the Submerged Lands Act. They contend that this difference in treatment 
violates the equal footing doctrine. The SG notes that this claim was expressly 
rejected in Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954). 
C.. North Carolina specifically excepts to the Master1 s determination that the 
States of Rho de Island and North Carolina were not wholly independent nations and 
did not have external sovereignty during the period be tween the operative date of the 
federal government under the Constitution and the subsequent dates when they ratified 
the Constitution. North Carolina argues that such a finding is contrary to the evidence 
a nd notes, inter alia, that early acts of Congress placed North Carolina and Rhode 
Island on the same footing as foreign countries. The SG relies on the findings of the 
Special Master that there is no evidence that either of the two States had withdrawn 
from the union formed by the Articles of Confederation, that Congress recognized 
them as a part of the United States and., in fact, in its legislation distinguished them 
from. foreign states. 
D. Georgia specifically excepts to the Ma ster 1 s conclusion that the State did 
not acquire the resources of the seabed under its boundary settlement of 1802 with 
the United States. Georgia argues that such a finding is contrary to the evidence, 




the United States" lying east of tbe States1 western boundary. The SG aga1n relles 
· on the finding of the Master that even if the agreement were construed to grant title 
to the seabed off Georgia 1 s coast, in 1802 the United States did not claim any juris-
diction over or title to the seabed of the c ontinental shelf beyond the three-mile belt 
of territorial sea. 
Eo The Special Maste r found tha t it does not appear that any exploration or 
exploitation has been carried on by the licensee of Maine or that any payn>ents ha\-e 
been made by it to tha t Sta te, and that an accounting is not required. I\o exceptions 
are taken to this finding. 
F. Amicus Special Committee on Tidelands notes the State s 1 economic and 
environmental interests in exploitation of the shelf. They attempt to demonstrate 
that unless they are to obtain the licensing fees, taxes etc. from such exploitation1 
they will get the shor t end of the stick1 paying out in services n>ore than they will 
take in in the taxation of spin-off development. Amicus As so cia ted Gas Distributors 
take no position in the litigation. They note the urgent need for fuel and, in essence1 
urge everyone to get on with deciding the case. In particular 1 they note the likelihoo d 
of extended litigation between the States as to the extent of State boundaries if the 
· States win and urges the Court to retain jurisdiction until all boundary disputes are 
resolved. 
DISCUSSION: The defendant States• attempts to distinguish-or limit-California 
appear futile. And1 the Court1 s historical findings there speci fic ally and clearly 
refute those now advanc ed by the Atlantic States, ~: 
"From all the wealth of materia 1 supplied ••• we 
cannot say that the thirteen origina l colonies 
separately acquired ownership to the three-mile 
belt or the soil under it .••• 11 332 at 31. 
"Neither the English charters granted to this 
nation's settlers, nor the treaty of peace with 
England, nor any other docum.ent to which we 
have been referred, showed a purpose to set 
apart a three-mile ocean belt 1or colon1a1 or state 
ownership. rr 332 U.S. at 32. 
"There is no substantial support i n history ::":>r the 
idea that [the settlers] wanted or claimed a :::-ight to 
block off the ocean's bottom for ~Jrivate owr.:.er s hip 
and use in the extraction of its \"':e alth. 11 332 at 
32-33. 
"Not only has acquisition .•• o f the three- r.:-_:.}e belt, 
been accomplished by the national Governrr.e:1t, but 
protection and control of it has bee n and is c. function 
of national external sovereignty . 11 332 U. S . at 34. 
The Courtt s focus on the three -mile belt would not appec. r of any releva:1ce and, in 
any event, Louisiana clearly extended these findings be~.·ond that limit. =: tlle 
historical analysis in California is weak, it is weak wit:. respect to the S:c.tes 1 claims 
to external sovereignty at independence. A recent article by Professor ~.~or ris of 
Columbia deals extensively with that claim and is stror:~ support for the :ecie ral 
government. Morris, The Forging of the 1:...-nion Recons :.dered: A Histor :cal 
Refutation of State Sovereignty Over Seabeds, 74 Colurr_ , L. Rev. 1056 (Oct. 1974). 
Gouverneur Morris contends that the historical evidence indicates that a ~tional 
goverprnent was in operation before the formation of the states. He reft:te s the 
agency theory advanced by the States by no ting that de le~ates to the Firs : Co ntinental 
Congress were selected in disregard of colonial as serr.·::: lies and by other extralegal 
means. It should also be noted, perhaps, that Fulton is cited extensive 1~.- :~roughout 
the California opinion and that the Court in California s~ecifically limits "'?Plication 
of the rationale of Pollard, Manchester and other ear l:: c ases. 
Although it is not clear what part the io reign-affa i :::- s and defense p ov::e :::-s 
rationale played in the California Court's a!lalysis, the Court seems to. :_c.--.-e in any 
event rejected the preemptive powers argwnent now ac·: a nced by the de :'"e::ca nt States. 
The States 1 historical arguments appear lar g ely repet i::....- e and although t::-_ey make 
much of it, the nature of their additional eYidence is not clear. In any e...-ent, there 
' 
' 
would appear to be no "clear error" in the California :'1olding and fhe SG' s sugg-e"'Snon 
that there be no departure from the doctrine of stare decisis seems persuasive. 
Finally~ there is the federal government's pendi ng motion for judgment on t:'1e 
pleadings 9 The Court's intent in the matter is not clear. 







MAINE, et al. 
The defendant States N (one of which is Virginia~ request 
that the Court allocate four hours for argument of this case. 
They assert that it is extremely complex, both legally and 
historacaly, and claim that that mush time is required for 
proper presentation of the issues.They further point out that 
the Court gave the Railroad Act three hours and assert 
that this case is equally important and more complicated. 
The ultimate issue here air &LX is described to be ownership 




There is no way to make anything more than a guess about 
amount of time required. My general skepticism toward 
\. prompts me o ec.ormnend two hours rather than four. ) 
fruitfulness of oral argumen~ . The parties assert tliat 
there are some issues that are distinct among them as well as 
come issues that they share in common. I would think that an hour 
on each side should allow the presentation of all of the issues, 
BOBTAIL MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Ron Carr DATE: February 24, 1975 
No. 35, Original - United States v. Maine, et al. 
I recorrnnend that you vote to enter judgment for the 
United States in accordance with the Special Master's recommended 
decree, although on the basis of reasoning somewhat at variance 
with that of the Special Master. 
I think it might be helpful briefly to outline the 
legal contours of the problem, if only to clarify the following 
discussion. In United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 
the Court held that, as between the state and national governments, 
the latter holds title to submerged lands seaward of the lew 
water mark on the coastline. California had argued that its 
state constitution, adopted contemporaneously to its admission, 
defined the state's boundary as three English miles seaward 
of the low water mark. Moreover, the eleven original riparian 
•k 
states, when they formed the union, assertedly had propriet~ry 
* I.e c, all thirteen original stat es, except for 
Connecticut-and Pennsylvania, plus Maine. Neither Connecticut 
nor Pennsylvania has an Atlantic coastline (Connecticut fronts 
Long Island Sound; Pennsylvania the upper Delaware River). 
2. 
rights out to the three-mile limit bounding the territorial 
seas. Since California, like all states, was admitted on 
an equal footing to the thirteen original states, i~proprietary 
rights must be the same. The Court rejected these arguments. 
It found that, when the union was formed, the boundaries of 
the original riparian states extended only to the low water - ...____ 
mark and that extension of the national boundaries to the three--
mile mark occurred, under international law, only thereafter. 
Hence, regardless of how state boundaries might be defined, 
the United States, rather than the states, held title to the 
submerged lands under the peripheral territorial seas. The 
territorial seas were acquired by the United States and not only 
the seas but the lands beneath them pertained to the external 
sovereignty of the nation. 
In U.S. v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 669 (Louisiana I) and 
U. S. v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, the Court held that, given its 
holding in California, it followed a fortiorari that title 
to submerged lands beyond the three mile limit was in the 
United States. Finally, in U.S. v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, the 
Court dealt with the construction of the Submerged Lands Act. 
That Act, passed in response to the decisions described above, 
confirmed in all riparian states boundaries out to three 
geographical miles from the low water mark and, in Gulf of 
Mexico states, boundaries out to three leagues, if those states 
could prove that such boundaries had received congressional 
3. 
recognition when they were admitted to the union. In addition, 
Congress ceded to the riparian states all of the United States' 
interest in the submerged lands within the states' boundaries. 
With this background in mind, I think it clear that 
the defendant states can succeed here only if California was 
wrong. In other words, they could succeed only if each of the 
following propositions is correct. (1) That from the 
inception of English colonization of this continent until 
independence, England had, under international law, title ........_ 
to the submerged lands underlying the seas adjacent to the 
continent, from the low water mark out to a point beyond the 
three mile limit of the subsequently recognized territorial seas. 
(2) That England's title to the submerged lands was granted 
to the riparian colonies in their colonial charters. (3) That, 
upon independence, title to the submerged lands remained in 
the new riparian states rather than passing to the United 
States collectively. (4) That, upon ratificat i on of the 
Constitution, title remained in the riparian states rather 
than passing to the United States collectively. (5) That 
such title was unaffected by the subsequent recognition of 
the United States of territorial seas limited to three miles 
from the low water mark. 
I think that the critical questions here are the 
first two, for the following reasons. If, in point of inter-
c==::: ::>-
national law, the riparian states held title to the submerged 
4. 
lands out to some distance on the continental shelf, I do 
not see how such title could be said to have passed to the 
United States collectively. It is true that under both the 
Articles of Confederation and the Constitution, such submerged 
lands would, in a sense, be affected with the external 
sovereignty of the nation. There is, I would think, no 
question that the United States could regulate their use, 
make treaties as to them, and so forth. But I don't see 
how these acknowledged foreign affairs, defense, and admiralty ----
powers of the United States require that the nation, rather 
than states, must have proprietary title to the lands. As 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter said in his dissent in California, 
there is a distinction between imperium and dominium; while 
the United States necessarily has the former, it does not 
follow that it has the latter. 
II '\ 
The critical question, then, is whether and to what 
extent the original riparian states held title to the submerged 
they declared independence from England. 
he question cannot be alone what England claimed as its 
property, but what was recognized as such in international law, 
i.~., the practice and acquiescence of the family of nations. 
Moreover, whatever England might have claimed in the seventeenth 
~ 
centuryA whatever property rights the colonies might have had 
were subject to defeasance by the British Government. Thus if, 
5. 
as of 1776, the British Government no longer claimed title 
to the submerged lands, no such title could have remained in 
or passed to the colonies upon independence. 
Under this analysis, much of the Common Counsel 
states' historical material is irrelevant. From the relevant 
materials, it seems to me clear that the Special Master's 
critical conclusion is correct: that, as of 1776, international 
law recognized in England (and hence its North American colonies) 
proprietary rights only in those submerged lands adjacent 
to the shores actually occupied or employed by the colonies 
or their citizens; at most, the colonies had proprietary rights ...____ 
to submerged lands under the territorial seas, i.~., those 
within "cannon shot" or three miles from shore. 
If this conclusion is correct, then it is clear that 
under international law any dominion over the submerged lands 
of the continental shelf, beyond three miles from the low 
water mark, did not arise until after independence. Indeed, 
from all indications, it did not arise until the Truman 
Proclamation following the Second World War, the principles 
of which were accepted by other nations in the Convention on 
the Continental Shelf (See Government's Brief at 56). Thus, 
the continental shelf submerged lands were incorporated into 
th:_United States only ~ubse9¥ent to independe? ce, by means 
of exercise of the national foreign affairs and military powers. 
6. 
As such, the submerged lands - like all "after-acquired" 
territories - are subject exclusively to the control of the 
United States and are within the national domain. 
It seems to me unnecessary to go beyond this 
analysis to sustain the Special Master's reconnnended judgment. 
The states' 11epal footing" argument - that they, like the 
Gulf states, should be allowed to establish historic boundaries 
out to three leagues,-seems to me without merit for the 
reasons given in the United States' brief, at 57-59. 
No. 35 Orig. U.S. v. Maine Argued 2/24/75 
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Lawmaking for the Seas 
by John R. Stevenson 
The United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea is engaged in a monumental task-nothing 
short of drafting a constitution for the oceans that will 
gain the support of the world's nations. The first 
substantive session of the conference has been 
concluded, and the second will open next month in 
Geneva. Several new approaches to international 
lawmaking are being used. 
THE THIRD United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea held its first substantive session last sum-
mer in Caracas from June 20 to August 29, and a sec-
ond substantive session is scheduled to meet for eight 
weeks in Geneva commencing on March 17 of this year. 
The fundamental task of thi~ conference, which many 
consider the most important international lawmaking 
conference since the establishment of the United Na-
tions in 1945, is to agree on a legal regime governing 
the activities of men and nations on more than two 
thirds of the surface of the world. The results of the 
first substantive session of the conference and the 
prospects for agreement have been reported in hear-
ings before congressional committccs 1 and in other 
journals 2 Rather than essentially repeating those re-
ports, this artick focuses on the law of the sea nego-
tiations as an example of the international lawmaking 
process and on those aspects of the process that appear 
to be most constructive in facilitating agreement on a· 
constitution for the oceans. 
Why do wc need international lawmaking for the 
seas? Considcration t)f this basic question resolves it-
self into two subqucstinns: Why do we need any legal 
rcgimc for the ocean , <lnd why is it necessary to have 
a system of intcrnational as opposed to national law 
for this vast area of the world? 
The answer to the first is merely a varinnt of the 
basic pnliticnl theory and jurisprudential inquiry as to 
why we need law at all: As long as nations and their 
nationnls w.c thi~ vast nrc<J and exploit its resources. 
there lllUS( be CCrtnin agreed principJcs of COIH]Uct to 
resolve competing uses and conflicts. Otherwise there 
will be chaos. 
But why is international rather than national Ia\\' 
making necessary? .• 
This is a more comp!Gx issue. One possibilit) would 
havo been to extend tho national state system 
established in the seventeenth century to em-
brace the seas as well as the land territory of the world. 
This, in fact, was attempted, with brief pcri,Kls of vary-
ing success, by those countries that sought to establish 
maritime empires with the same sovereignty over the 
seas as they had on Janel. Because of the desires , how-
ever, of other states to navigate freely and to cn rry on 
naval and commercial activities throughou t th e oce an ~ 
without seeking the consent of a territoria l sm ercign . 
the extension of coastal slate territorial sovereignty was 
limited by and large to a fairly narrow belt of territorial 
sea that ranged until very recent history be.tween three 
and twelve miles. In the area beyond the intcrnatiu:wl 
regime freedom of the seas was firmly estahlishecl. 
This regime excluded national sovereignty over the 
ocean and permitted everyone the free usc of the 
seas and their resources, providing they showccl reason -
able regard for the interests of others in thcir exercise 
of this freedom. 
This simple, comprehensive rule of intcrnationul hm· 
served the in!ernational community well for more than 
three centuries. Tt reflected the general interest in free 
common utilization of the ocean, at Icast on the part 
of those countries with the national power to c:1forec 
this rule and the apparent inexhaustability of the 
. principal ocean resource-fish. Moreover, while thi~ 
basic constitutional provision was a rule of customar~ 
intern;:!tional law 'only finally codified in the 1958 High 
Seas Convention, the constitutional allocation of powers 
provided for a large measure o( national juri~diction 
through the establishment of the principle of flag state' 
control over vessels navigating the high seas. 
Commencing at the end of World War I I. howevcr. 
this established constitutional scheme for the ocean-
freedom of the high seas beyond a narrow territorial sea 
with (lag state control over vessels on the high seas-
has been widely challengcd 011 the ground that it IH' 
longer serves the needs of the international communit~. 
I. I It' a ring' hl'IPIT Sl·natc Fnr •.:ign RL'lat ion~ Committ e ~..· on "i L·p t~o:m hn " 
1974. SuhcnmmitllT on M i n~..·r:d ... , ~1:tiLTi:ll:-. and FuL·I.., of SL'Il :t ll ltl!L' r i\'! 
nnd ln~td:tr (LHtttnitltT nn Scptcrn!wr 17, I 1J74, llou~l· {)f \{Lptr ,t· rn :tt in ·, 
M(' tTllanl Ma1 inc :rnd l'i -. lu.:r iL'" CummitiL'L' nn Sl·ptvlllhl' l 2S. J(l74 . :uHI 
IIOLIO..,L' of Rl'ptL' ~L· ntativL·~ Forct~·n Affai1..., Commiltt:c on 1\:t i \L'Inhl.·r I ~.J. 
1974. 
2. Stcvcn..,on and Oxmnn, Tltt' 1 !Jird United 1\'ation\ I a1' uf tllr ,\1 11 
Con/1'rence: 'flt1· 1974 Caru('O\ St' .\\iun, 6() ;\M . .f. IN'I'r. . L. C IY7SJ . 
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The explanation for this chalien'ge has many aspects. 
In the first place, a kchnological explosion has in-
crea.scJ and intensified the uses of the ocean. The 
traditional uses-navigation and fishing- are now car-
ried on in entirely new types of ships and cquipment-
500,000-ton supertankers, nuclear-powered and armed 
submarines, and factory fishing vessels equipped with 
electronic tracking gear. There arc also vast increases 
in the numbers and tonnage of vessels and economic 
effort devoted to these traditional uses to the point 
that the world today faces a very serious problem of 
congestion and navigational safety in important ship-
ping routes, over fishing and depletion of fish stocks, 
and pollution of the ocean. 
We also have many entirely new uses of the ocean: 
exploitation of the world's most important new sources 
of petroleum in the continental margins of the world, 
as well as the nickel, copper, and other hard minerals 
soon to be produced from manganese nodules from the 
deep ocean seabed; intensified scientific research add-
ing to our knowledge not only of the oceans but also 
of our climate and the planet as a whole; and increas-
ingly diversified recreational uses of the ocean and 
its beaches. 
The failure of the traditional freedom-of-the-seas 
principle to deal adequately with coastal states' con-
cerns for the utilization of the oceans and their re-
sources beyond a narrow territorial sea has led to a 
renewal of the seventeenth-century attempt to extend 
the national state system to the oceans-this time 
through coastal state claims of territorial sovereignty 
extending beyond twelve and up to two hundred miles. 
At the same time the maritime countries, which for 
so long upheld the freedom-of-the-seas principle through 
force, if necessary, have become increasingly inhibited 
by limitations in the U.N. Charter and other treaties 
on the use of force, as well as the high political cost in 
terms of alliance policies and other foreign policy ob-
jectives, in restricting coastal state claims through the 
application of force. 
Finally, the sharp increase in the number of national 
states from some fifty at the time of the founding of 
the United Nations to roughly a hundred and fifty 
toda) has increased the demand for a fundamental re-
molding of the law of the sea to take into greater 
account the interests of the developing and newly inde-
pendent countries, a demand that the increasing role 
of ·.international organizations, based on the principle 
of the sovereign equality of all states, has made in-
creasingly difficult for the major maritime and devel-
oped ·tatcs to ignore. 
The net result, in the absence of international agree-
ment. has been a spiral of competing and escalating 
claims to the use of the same ocean space and resources, 
F l" ITO R's ...,.OTE: The views ~xprc sscd arc tho~c of tl1c author and do not 
n~ce .. ... a rily re prc'\ent the views or the l)cpanrnent of State or the United 
Suit e ' gove rnment. This article has been adapted hy the author from his 
remar k' at the Princeton Univcr~ity Confcrcnc(' on ''A New World Order," 
N \H ~mbcr , 1974. 
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and thi~ has rcsui't'C"d in increasing conflict and disorder. 
The Law of the Sea Conference may be viewed in this 
context as the international community's best and per-
haps last opportunity to arrest this new extension of 
the national state system and reach an agreed inter-
national solution that will avoid conflict over unilateral 
claims and an ultimate partition of the ocean. 
Granted the necessity of achieving promptly a new 
constitution for the ocean, how can this best be 
achieved? In the present stage of development of the 
international community the only three ·alternatives 
would appear to be: the traditional customary lawmak-
ing process involving changes accomplished principally 
through the unilateral assertion of claims that other 
states accept or acquiesce in over time; the interna-
tional, multilateral lawmaking treaty process in which 
the Law of the Sea Conference is engaged; and finally 
the establishment of a new international organization 
with the authority to enact and enforce binding legis-
lation for · the ocean. 
The difficulty with the customary lawmaking process 
as applied to today's ocean is not only the inevitable 
conflict that is produced by differing perceptions of 
legal rights and national interests but also the inability 
to make satisfactory functional accommodations be-
tween competing claims for the use of the same ocean 
space. It is my view, shared by many other partici-
pants in the law of the seas negotiations, that, in the 
absence of a generally accepted international agree-
ment, the most likely result will be the extension of the 
national state system to the high seas through the estab-
lishment of territorial seas of two hundred miles or 
more, with no provision for freedom of navigation or 
overflight beyond twelve miles or for unimpeded transit 
of straits. This would be accompanied by continuing 
conflict with respect to national claims to the use of 
the ocean in the area beyond, including the exploita-
tion of the deep seabed's resources. 
While this outcome would give coastal states the 
control they seek over coastal resources, pollution, and 
scientific research, it would seriously prejudice all states' 
navigational interests in unimpeded transit of straits 
and in using the one third of the ocean that would be 
overlapped by two-hundred-mile territorial seas, as well 
as their interests in distant water resource exploitation, 
scientific research, and effective international pollution 
standards for the ocean. It is simply not possible 
through unilateral customary lawmaking to achieve a 
functional accommodation of interests through a twelve-
mile territorial sea accompanied by an economic zone 
extending to two hundred miles in which the inter.ests 
of coastal states in controlling resources, participating 
in scientific research, and preventing pollution, and the 
interests of all states in free navigation and overflight, 
promotion of scientific research, and other high seas 
uses aro reconciled through a balance of obligations, 
cnforce::~ble through compulsory dispute settlement. 
Unilateral international lawmaking favors the blunt 
··' < ··, 
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than a delicate adjustment in <H.:cordancc with func-
tional needs. 
At the other 0xtrcmc. the international community 
clearly docs not seem any more prepared in the ocean 
lh<ln in other areas to deal with thl\ problem by the 
fundamental reordering of the national state system that 
would be entailed in the establishment of an interna-
tional organization with the general power to enact and 
enforce the necessary substantive rules. In some limited 
areas, however, the establishment of an international 
organization with carefully prescribed rule-making au-
thority and a balanced decision-making process, taking 
into account not only the numbers of sovereign states 
involved but other important factors as well, appears 
to be a necessary supplement to a comprehensive inter-
national treaty. 
If a comprehensive multilateral treaty appears to be 
the best, if not the only, viable solution to lawmaking 
for the oceans, what lessons do the law of the sea 
negotiations hold for the achievement of a treaty? 
One of the first issues to be resolved was the nature 
of the treaty. Shortly after the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1967 turned to the consideration of the 
problems of a legal regime for the deep seabed by 
establishing a special committee, the Soviet Union 
began exploring the possibility of resolving the princi-
pal question on which the 1958 and 1960 Law of the 
Sea Conferences failed to reach agreement-the breadth 
of the territorial sea. It was encouraged in its belief 
that agreement might be possible by the willingness of 
the United States (in a change from its position at the 
earlier conference) to agree to a twelve-mile territorial 
sea, provided free transit through, over, and under 
straits used for international navigation was guaranteed. 
Both countries recognized that general agreement on a 
twelve-mile territorial sea would require some recogni-
tion of preferential fishing rights of coastal states be-
yond twelve miles. 
It was the initial position of the United States and 
other maritime countries that the law of the sea was 
so complex that its many problems could better be 
dealt with in what were called "manageable packages" 
and that the negotiations with respect to the deep sea-
bed should proceed independently of the negotiations 
dealing with the more traditional subjects of the ter-
ritorial sea, straits, and fisheries. This proposal was 
strongly opposed by the developing countries, however. 
and they were successful in broadening the General 
Assembly's 1970 resolution. which called for a Law 
of the Sea Conference, to provide for a comprehensive 
treaty dealing not only with these subjects but also 
with pollution, scientific research , and the high seas 
and continental shelf regimes. The 1973 General 1\s-
scmhly resolution fixing the schedule for the confer-
ence went even further and tktermined that till' man -
date of the conference would he "to adopt a convention 
dealing with all matters relating to the law of the sea 
... 
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... bearing in mind that the problems of nccan :,pa~· l 
arc closely interrelated and neecl to be conside red a~ 
a whole." 
Whil e this comprehensive approach ha~ increased 
the difficulty of the negotiations b) increasing the num · 
ber of items with which the conference must deal. it i~ 
my view that, on balance, it has been a fa\'orablc de-
velopment facilitating the achievement of gennal agree-
ment. 
Countries Now Must Consider the "Package" 
In the first place, countries part1c1pating in the ne-
gotiations must now consider the entire "pacl..agc·· ol 
law-of-the-sea treaty provisions rather than on!~ their 
own particular interests in one or more item'. TilL': 
must, in effect, accept or reject the treat) as a whok 
rather than picking and choosing in accordance ''it h 
their special interests. 
Second , many of the ostensibly different subject~ 
involve the usc of the same ocean space. For example. 
among the most difficult remaining negotiating i~!'ucs 
with respect to lhc nature of the economic zone arc 
the accommodation of navigational, economic. scien-
tific, environmental, and national security interc. ts 
within that zone. 
Finally, the very outlines of the general agreement 
on which a consensus appears to be e\'olving also de-
pend on a comprehensive approach. While on the one 
hand the United States and other maritime p011 ers arc 
unwilling to accept a twelve-mile territorial sea " ·ithnut 
concurrent agreement on unimpeded transit of intl'l'-
national straits, most coastal states arc un11 illing 111 
agree to limit coastal state territorial stwcrcignt:- ((1 
twelve miles unless they have broad control mer rL' -
sourccs in an economic zone lJL·yond twclw mik">. :-\nr. 
on the other hand , do the deve loping countrie~ appl'~ l l 
willing to agree on the protection of the na,·igatiPnal 
interests of maritime countries in the area bc)nnd 
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t\\dvc miles and in international straits without con-
curren t agreement on a deep seabed regime in which 
their intc rc~;ts in participation in the "common heritage 
L'f t:wnk:nJ" arc recognized. 
. -\ s..:cond common assumption in the negotiations 
h ~b been thl' de:,irability-indced, in the view of many, 
the practical necessity-of achieving very general agree-
ment and not just a majority or even a two- thirds ma-
jL~rit;. for the treaty. This was reflected in the gentle-
men's agreeme nt to make every effort to reach an accord 
Lln substantiw matters by way of consensus. This was 
the basis for the adoption of the 1973 General Asscm-
bl: resolution scheduling the conference. The gentle-
men's agreement expressly recognizes "the desirability 
of adopting a convention on the law of the sea which 
\\ L1uld secu re the widest possible acceptance." 
This understanding reflects not only the basic legal 
~1 roblcms that would be implicit in a new constitution 
for the ocean .to which a number of important states 
UL) not becPmc parties but also the underlying restraint 
L~n voting majonttes in treaty-making conferences, 
namely, that to be binding on an individual state tho 
treaty must be accepted by that state. If important mari-
time and coastal states do not feel that their interests 
hem~ been accommodated adequately in the compre-
hensi'e treaty, they may refuse to go along and make 
n1<:anin~lc~s the voting majorities by which the treaty 
ll:'.xts are adopted at the conference. 
.-\pa.rt from these general principles, what have been 
the specific lawmaking processes followed in the law of 
th~ sea negotiations? Prior to the first and second 
Law cf the Sea Conferences, a single treaty text was 
prepared by the International Law Commission after 
l~b~aining the comments of nations on the commission's 
Jral't texts. This single text was then discussed, amend-
ed. and voted on at the conferences. The third con-
ference ha~ followed essentially the reverse procedure. 
Tlk· \ aricus national interests and objectives have been 
discussed in ge neral terms both in the preparatory com-
mittee ;111d conference, with states submitting their com-
p-?t ing texts on most treaty articles to be considered 
b: the conference and its committees and to be reduced 
ultim,Hely to a single, approved text. 
The difference may be accounted for in part by the 
fact that the 1958 conference was a confercn.ce devoted 
in many respects to codifying existing law, whereas the 
role of the prese nt conference is not only to modernize 
codified law in the light of changing circumstances Dnd 
fil l in the gaps, such as the breadth of the territorial 
,ca. but also to provide progressive development of en-
tirely new law in areas such as the deep seabeds and 
the protection of the environment. The process followed 
has been somewhat prolonged, particularly as a result 
11f unn ... ·ce,sary delay in turning to substantive discus-
<.ions bcc:Hlso of organizational and procedural clis-
.tgrecnwnts and a carryove r from the General Asse mbly 
,1[ man) tactical techniques more appropriate to the 
passage of Gene ral Assembly resolutions th:tn inter-




national lawmaking. But the. general approach has been 
appropriate to a lawmaking cl'fort of this nature, an 
effort nothing short of adopting a constitution [or the 
ocean . 
Seabeds Committee Identified National Interests 
In view of the vital and diversifi ed national interests 
involved, this was not a task that should have been en-
trusted to legal technicians in the first instance. Before 
a precise treaty text could be ge nerally agreed on, it 
was clearly necessary for the nations of the world, in-
cluding the many newly independent ones, to under-
stand the nature of the task and where their respective 
national interests lay and to agree on at least the broad 
political framework of a generally acceptable agreement. 
This has been achieved in the preparatory work of the 
United Nations Seabeds Committee and in the general 
debate and committee discussions last stimmer at Ca-
racas. Most countries have indicated a clear apprecia-
tion of their national interests, and there appears to be 
broad general support in favor of a comprehensive 
treaty based on a twelve-mile territorial sea, a coastal 
state economic zone of two hundred miles, and an in-
ternational regime and authority for the exploitation of 
the mineral resources of the deep seabed beyond the 
economic jurisdiction of coastal states. 
The broad ranging discussions to date·, also have 
identified the critical areas of negotiation for achieving 
a final agreement: unimpeded transit of international 
straits overlapped by a twelve-mile territorial sea; inter-
national limitations on coastal state resource jurisdiction 
in the economic zone (such as full utilization and con-
servation obligations with respect to fisheries and some 
modest payments with respect to oil production to be 
used for internationaL community purposes); the ex-
tent of a coastal state's nonresource rights in the eco-
nomic zone, particularly as to pollution and scientific 
research; equitable treatment of landlocked states; and 
the extent of the Seab'cd Authority's discretion with 
respect to access and regulation of the exploitation of 
the hard minerals found in the manganese nodules of 
the deep seabed and the role of the authority in that 
exploitation. 
The success of the Law of the Sea Conference will 
depend on its ability to resolve these difficult remain-
ing issues and translate the emerging consensus into 
generally acceptable detailed treaty provisions. This 
in turn will depend in large measure on the willingness 
of governments to make a number of hard decisions 
on the critical issues remaining and to give their repre-
se ntatives the necessary inst ructions to permit effective 
negotiation. The international lawmaking procedures 
followed, however, may also contribute to the ultimate 
success or failure of the conference. Certain proced ural 
aspects of lhe negot iations merit more dct~1iled con-;id-
cration- (I) decision making, (2) the role of corn-
mittces and working grnups, and ( 3) the establishment 
ol' rule--makin g machinery and compulsory dispute 
'>L'ttklllL'llt to deal with '01llL'"'rif the items on the con -
krenCL''' agenda. 
l>cd~ion I\ laking. In connection with the adopt ion 
of its ruks of procedure on .June 20, I <)74, by con-
~cnstls, the conference endorsed the follm\ ing declara-
ation by it~ president confirming the gentlemen's agrec-
mcnt on the basis nf which the General Assembly 
adopll'd thc resolution schcduling the conference: 
Ht.:aring in mind that the problems of ocean -,pact.: arc 
closL'Iy 1ntt.:rrelated and need tu be considered as a whole 
and the desirability of adopting a Convention on the Law 
of the Sea which will secure the widest possible accept-
ance, 
1 he conferenec -,lwuld make every effort to reach 
agreement on substantive matters by way of consensus 
and there should be no \ oting on such matters until all 
efl'orts at LOnsen :-. us ha\e been exhamted. 
The rules of proccuure contain certain provtsJons 
that may be viewed as an attempt to reconcile the in-
terest in achieving a treaty generally acceptable among 
all groups of state<; with the necessity for expeditious 
action . 
The voting rules that have been used in most United 
Natiom lawmaking conferences have provided for de-
cisions on matters of substance in committee by a ma-
jority vote of states present and voting and in the full 
conference by a two-thirds majority of states present 
and voting. Since abstentions arc not counteu, this fre-
quently has permitted the auoption of important rules of 
law by a small number of the participating states. The 
Law of the Sea Conference rules provide that the two-
thirus majority in plenary must include at least a major-
ity of the states participating in that session of the con-
ference . They also provide expressly for the adoption 
by the same qualificu majority of the text of the con-
vention as a whole in addition to the adoption of in-
dividual articles. 
Rule 37 of the conference rules sets out a novel pro-
cedure in international lawmaking somewhat akin to the 
"preliminary question" practice of parliamentary bodies 
in determining whether a vote should be taken. Before a 
matter of substance is put to a vote, the committee or 
the plenary, as the case may be, must decide that all 
efforts at reaching agreement have been cxhausteu. 
Provision is also made for perious of uelay prior to 
making that determination, during which the chairman 
or the president arc "to make every effort ... to fa-
cilitate the achievement of general agreement. having 
regard to the owr-all progress made on all matters of 
substance which aro closely rdatt:d." 
The gentlemen's agreement and these rules should 
facilitate the achievement of a g nerally acceptable 
treaty and at the same time prevent holders of extreme 
positions from unduly Lklaying agreement through pro-
cedural mancu\ crs. 
Agreement hy consensw ... while not requiring the 
affirmatiw C\prcss app!\l\'al of a tC\t by every partici-
pating delegation. docs give any ckkgation that is pre-
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p:trcd to stanc 1p and bt: counted thL· r; ght ll' bind .. 
agrecmcnt. ;\ prm ision to proceed cxclu '>i\ , I ~ b ~ cun-
sensus would not bc k:1siblc for a subJ eCt a' ~·,11np k \ 
as the law of the sea, in which so many import ,ull an d 
disparatv national interests arc involved . The dt'cL't c1f 
the gentlemen's agreement, plus the proccd u1 :d rul, . fa-
cilitating a consensus but pro\'iding for reso rt t'' \lltin~ 
if necessary, should dissuade states that might lhL' their 
right to block agreement by consensus from doing SL' 
and should cnabk both the committees and the pknar~ 
to proeecu further by wnsensus than might ha\C bL·cn 
thought possible. 
The provisions for a preliminary vote on \\ hl'th .: r 
efforts to reach general agrccment have been e \hau~ted 
should bCl ·helpful to thos~ responsible kadcr~ \\ ho. 
while having the necessary voting majori tie -. tl' pu'h 
through a particular proposal without am enJm~ nt. 
recognize that to do so would jeopardize the gcn.:ral 
acceptance of the treaty and who would prefer w del a) 
the vote on a matter of substance until furth n dfLHl' 
at reaching agreement have been mauc .. , h<?rc h ~l ~ b.:cn 
some skepticism cxpresseu that if the vo lLs arc th .: rc. 
to carry a particular substantive position , the.') \\ill b-: 
used automatically to determine that all c!'fort~ at reach-
ing agreement have been exhausted. But this sJ...eptici,m 
docs not seem warrantcu. 
One of the most difficult problems of Ia\\ m.tking in 
an international community of equal sovereign qa!L'~ 
with enormous differences in area, p'opulation. rcs,,ur.:~.. '· 
and development is the uisproportionatcl) l:ug~· \\1tin,; 
power of smaller countries, including man) of thl' ne" I) 
independent members of the international n)mmunit~ . 
The principal protection against any abus,· L) f the ,ln,·-
nation, one-vote principle in treaty making is. of cour,c. 
the impossibility of binding a dissenting minorit~ tll:lt 
refuses to ratify the treaty. The Law of thL' S.:a CL'nt'~..· r­
ence has made an important contribution tl) reCl)Ilciling 
the one-nation, one-vote principle with the rcaliti-:s ,)f 
power and responsibility through procedural inno\ati<'ll' 
that strengthen the position of responsible lcadcr,hi~' 
in working for a generally acceptable treat~. 
Committees and Working Groups. One nf the \1 a~, 
the one-nation, one-vote principle has beL'Il pre\ cnt~.· ,! 
from ob~tructing effective Ia\\ making has bc~..· n to m.,in-
tain this principle in the plenary organ anu committ~..· ,· , 
of the whole, while prm iding more equitable rep r ~.. 
scnta-tion in smaller committees and othcr subsidi.1n 
organs or in a preparatory committee. The rclianCL' 111 
the prior conferences on the International Ll\\ C,,m-
mis~ion was an instance of this techniqu,·. and it h. ,, 
been the practice of a number of conkrenc~·s to c~t.il'­
lish special committees or working grouJb eon-,istin'-" ,,! 
less than the entire membership of the r.;,,nferLIKl'. 
The record of the Law of the Sea (\mkrL"nc~.· 111 
this area has been somC\\ hat mixed. Th( three lll. ti · 
committee;. arc committees of the whok . and in tl,,· 
organiz:1ti,,n sc~~ion of the conference there was e<'n-
siderablc espousal of the prnposition that in the di~tri 
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bution of positions on committees ~limiteJ member-
sh ip the principle of "one nation, one scat" (taking all 
of the committees as a group) should be the logical 
corolletry or "one nation, one vote." This principle was 
watered down in formal confcn~ncc action, however, to 
the proposition that no state should be entitled as of 
right to membership on more than one limited mem-
be rship committee. In practice, the United States and 
the Soviet Union were elected to both the general com-
mittee and the drafting committee. 
The conference has been reluctant to provide for the 
e~tablishment of subsidiary organs, such as working or 
drafting groups, composed of less than the entire mem-
bership. When smaller groups have been appointed, it 
usually has been with the proviso that they be open-
ended in the sense that any state not appointed may 
participate in their deliberations as an observer. The 
result has been that some of the drafting and negotiating 
that could be done most c.ffcctively by smaller bodies of 
the conference wilih a representative cross-section of 
various geographic and other interest groups have been 
conducted by the regional geographic groups in the con-
ference from the U.N. General Assembly. 
While these groups have been useful in the absence 
of other means of consideration of issues by smaller 
groups, their organization along essentially regional 
political lines can be divisive and invites rigidity, par-
ticularly when the group has worked out delicate com-
promises that leave little flexibility for negotiation. 
Some of the most effective negotiating and drafting 
have been accomplished by unofficial groups with like 
substantive interests, such as a coastal state group or 
a group of states interested in compulsory dispute 
settlement. The latter group, meeting under the cochair-
manship of lhe El Salvador and Australian chiefs of 
delegation with Prof. Louis Sohn of Harvard as rappor-
teur, prepared a set of alternative treaty texts on the im-
portant issues in this area. It was introduced i"n the 
plenary Ill the final week of the conference with the co-
sponsorship of states from four ~liffcrent regional areas. 
There also has been a group of individual international 
lawyers, principally heads of delegations, meeting under 
tho chninnanship of the chairman of the Norwegian dele-
gation, which has been doing valuable work in seeking 
to reduce the number of alternative texts and to arrive 
at a single, widely acceptable text. 
As a practical matter, the insistence that all states 
be rc1Yrescntcd on official committees and working 
gro ups has prevented the conduct of intcrscssionnl work 
by official groups nnd has relegated intcrscssional work 
principally to meetings of regional and unofficial groups. 
Rule 1\laking and Compulsory Dispute Settlement. 
In making law for the ocean, participants in the Law 
or the Sea Conference arc in some respects engaged in 
two rather distinct efforts. On the one hand they arc 
drafting a constitution-that is, determining the respec-
tive jurisdiction of states and the Seabed Authority and 
tlte aii\1Cati L'l1 of the power to determine and enforce 
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rules of conduct for the activities of states and thctr 
nationals in the oceans. ln addition, particularly when 
there is nn overlap of .iurisdiction or an accommodation 
of competing uses problem-as, for example, with re-
spect to vessels in the economic zone--it may be de-
sirable for the law of the sea treaty itself to sp.:ll out 
the substantive rules to he applied. There arc many 
areas, however-as, for example, the rules with respect 
to the protection of the environment-where detailed 
rule making may best be left to the future. 
One very impo1tant clement in effective lawmaking 
for the ocean may well be (or the conference itself 
not to strive to establish rules of conduct in all areas, 
but rather to concentrate on the few essential areas and 
on rule-making machinery that cq uitably reflects popula-
tion , geographic position, resources, development, and 
other relevant factors, as well as numbers of sovereign 
states. In a certain sense, in international lawmaking it 
is not the one-nation, one-vote principle that best ex-
presses the existing sovereign equality of states but 
rather the right of each state to refuse to be bound in 
the absenco of its consent. An agreement to accept 
future rule making by some qualified majority is to that 
extent a yielding of an individual state's sovereignty, 
and this will only be acceptable if equitable procedures 
for reflecting states' different interests arc found. 
Second, in view of the necessary generality of many 
of the provisions in the treaty and the necessity for the 
accommodation of different: uses of the same ocean 
space, particularly in the economic zone, it is important 
that a lawmaking treaty for the ocean include effective 
provisions for the compulsory settlement of disputes. 
Compulsory dispute settlement machinery is the most 
equitable and reasonable basis for dealing with the 
many difficult boundary delimitation questions involv-
ing many quite dissimilar factual situations. 
Conference Tests International Law 
Lawmaking for the ocean is important not only 
for the peaceful resolution of the critical issues of na-
tional and international interest but also for the de-
velopment of the international legal process. If the in-
ternational community cannot deal effectively with the 
problems of lawmaking in this area, in which a large 
measure of mutual accommodation appears feasible 
and in which there is a very broad common interest in 
minimum rules of order on which all can rely, thus 
giving the negotiation a dimension going beyond the 
mere maximi zation of particular national interests, the 
prospects for dealing with other more intensely political 
disputes is bleak indeed. If, on the other hand, in this 
area in which internat ional law has played an important 
role for so long, the Jaw can be successfully adapted 
to the changes brought abo ut by the new technology 
and the evolving str ucture of the international state 
system, the gains should extend far beyond the ocean 
to the benefit of international lawmaking and inter-
national institutions generally. A 
: 
CHAMI!II!:RS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.Snp:rtntt <qourt 1tf tlrt~b ,jhdtg 
Jfas4inght~. ~. <q. 2ll~J!.~ 
March 3, 1975 
Re: 35 Orig. - U. S. v. Maine 
MEMOAANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
In this case there seems to be four Justices who think 
an opinion (either per curiam or signed) should be 
written. 
Beyond doubt time is of the essence on this matter and 
I believe we should announce the disposition as soon 
as possible and let the opinion follow, unless the "brief" 
opinion suggested by someone can come down within 
two weeks, i.e., March 17. 
Byron was perhaps the most vehement on the matter of 
an opinion preceding the Decree and I assign the case 
to him. He will work out the possible remand to the 
Special Master to consider the alternative basis for his 
recommendation on the juridical bay at the southerly 
tip of the mainland. 
Regards, 
,J ) 





To: The Chief Justice 
Mr . Justice Dougla8 
Mr . Justice Brennan 
Mr. J ustice Stewart 
Mr . Justi ce Marshall 
Mr . Justi ce Dlackmun 
~ Jus tice Powell 
.M:r . ,Justice Rehnquis t 
Ii'rom : Whl.te , J. 
c::ro'.l1ated : ,.;;_ ~~- 16-
Rocj.r cula t ed: 
SUPREME COURT 'OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 35, Orig. 
United States, Plaintiff, I 
v. 
State of Maine et al. 
On Bill of Complaint. 
[March -, 1975] 
MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under 
Art. III, § 2, and 28 U. S. C. § 1251 (b), the United States 
in April 1969 sought leave to file a complaint against the 
13 States bordering on the Atlantic Ocean-Maine, New 
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, 
New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Caro-
lina, South Ca.rolina, Georgia, and Florida.1 We granted 
leave to file, 395 U. S. 955, on June 16, 1969·. The com-
plaint asserted a separate cause of action against each of 
the States and each alleged that: 
"The United States is now entitled, to the exclusion 
of the defendant State, to exercise sovereignty rights 
over the seabed and subsoil underlying the Atlantic 
Ocean, lying more than three geographical miles sea-
ward from the ordmary low watermark and from the 
outer limits of inland waters on the coast, extending 
seaward to the outer edge of the Continental Shelf, 
for the purpose of exploring the area and exploiting 
the natural resources." 
1 The State of Connecticut wa~ not made a defendant, apparently 
because that State borders on Long Island Sound, which is consid-
erPd inl:md waters rather than open sea. 
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It was further alleged that each of the States claimed 
some right or title to the relevant area and was inter-
ferring with the rights of the United States. It was 
therefore prayed that a decree be entered declaring the 
rights of the United States and that such further relief 
be awarded as may prove proper.2 
The defendants answered, each generally denying pro-
prietary rights of the United States in the seabed in the 
area beyond the three-mile marginal sea. Each of them, 
except Florida,8 claimed for itself, as successor in title 
to certain grantees of the Crown of England (and in the 
case of New York, to the Crown of Holland), the exclu-
sive right of dominion and control over the seabed under-
lying the Atlantic Ocean seaward from its coastline to 
the limits of the jurisdiction of the United States, assert-
ing as well that any attempt by the United States to 
interfere with these rights would in itself violate the 
Constitution of the United States.4 
2 The United States also demandf'd an accounting for all sum that 
the States may have derived from the area in question. This de-
mand was ultimately denied for failure of proof. 
8 The State of Florida claimed that by virtue of the Act of June 25, 
1968, 15 Stat. 73, Congress had approved the maritime boundaries 
for that State which at certain places included more than three miles 
of the Atlantic Ocean and had thereby granted to the State all of the 
Sf'abed Within those boundarieR. Florida also claimed in its answer 
that the Florida Straits were not in the Atlantic Ocean as claimed 
by the United States but in the Gulf of Mexico. Subsequently, thil 
controversy between the Umted States and Florida was severed and 
consolidated with the proceedmg m No. 9 Original which was then 
concrrned with the seabed rights of the State of Florida in the Gulf of 
Mexico, 403 U.S 949, 950 (1971). (The consolidated proceedings 
wert> given a new number-Original 52. We have acted on the 
Spt>cial Master's Report in that case. See ante, p. -.) 
4 The States of Rhode Island, North Carolina, and Georgia each 
,;ubmJtted an additional special defense applicable only to itself. We 
agret· with the Rpecial Mast(:>r's rej(:>ctwn of the:;e special defenses, 
and they will not be mentiOned further. 
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Without acting on the motiou for judgment which was 
filed by the United States and which asserted that there 
was no material issue of fact to be resolved, we entered 
an order appointing the Honorable Albert B. Maris as 
Special Master and referred the case to him with author-
ity to request further pleadings, to summon witnesses 
and to take such evidence and submit such reports as he 
might deem appropriate. 398 U.S. 941 (1970). Before 
the Special Master, the United States contended that 
based on United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19 (1947); 
United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United 
States v. Texas, 339 U. S. 707 (1950), it was entitled to 
judgment in accordance with its motion. The defendant 
States asserted that their cases were distinguishable from 
the prior cases and that in any event, California, Louisi-
ana, and Texas were erroneously decided and should be 
overruled. They offered, and the Special Master re-
ceived, voluminous documentary evidence to support 
their claims that, contrary to the Court's prior decisions, 
they acquired dominion over the offshore seabed prior 
to the adoption of the Constitution and at no time re-
linquished· it to the United States. At the conclusion of 
the proceeding before him, the Special Master submitted 
a Report which the United States supports in all respects 
but to which the States have submitted extensive and 
detailed exceptions. The controversy is now before us 
on the Report, the exceptions to it and the briefs and 
oral arguments of the parties. 
In his Report, the Special Master concluded that the 
California, Louisiana and Texas cases, which he deemed 
binding on him, governed this case and required that 
judgment be entered for the United States. Assuming, 
however, that those cases were open to re-examination, 
the Special Master went on independently to examine 
the legal and factual contentions of the States and con-
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eluded that they were without ment and that the Court's 
prior cases should be reaffirmed. 
We fully agree with the Special Master that California, 
Louisiana, and Texas rule the issues before us. We also 
decline to overrule those cases as the defendant States 
request us to do. 
United States v. California, supra, involved an original 
action brought in this Court by the United States seeking 
a decree declaring its paramount rights, to the exclusion 
of California, to the seabed underlying the Pacific Ocean 
and extending three miles from the coastline and from the 
seaward limits of the State's inland waters. California 
answered, claiming ownership of the disputed seabed. 
The basis of its claim, as the Court described it, was that 
the three-mile belt lay within the historic boundaries of 
the State; "that the original States acquired frbm the 
Crown of England title to all lands within their bouud-
--~-'-------'fai:rruie;'Ss'iuwiml 3'ie~r~~~·~ waters, incJ udiug a three-mile belt 
in adjacent seas; and that since California was admitted 
as a State on an 'equal footing' with the original States, 
California at that time became vested with title to all 
such lands." 332 U. S., at 23. The Court rejected Cali-
fornia's claim. The original Colonies had not "separately 
acqUired ownership of the three-mile belt or the soil under 
it, even if they did- acquire elements of the sovereignty of 
the E11glish Crown by their revolution against it.'' 332 
U S., at 31. As the Court viewed our history, dominion 
over the marginal sea was first accomplished by the N a-
twnal Government rather than by the Colonies or by the 
~tates . Moreover. the Court went on to hold that the 
"protection and control of [the margmal sea] has been 
aud is a function of national external sovereignty, '' 332 
U. S., at 34, and that in our constitutiOnal system para-
mount rights over the ocean waters and their seabed were 
vested in the F ederal Government. 
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The United States later brought actions to confirm its 
title to the seabed adjacent to the coastline of other 
States. United States v. Louisiana, supra, was one of 
them. There Louisiana claimed title to the seabed under 
waters extending 27 miles into the Gulf of Mexico, the 
basis of the claim being that before and since the time of 
her admission to the Union, Louisiana had exercised do-
minion over the ocean area in question and that her 
legislature had formally included the 27-mile belt within 
the boundaries of the State. The Court gave judgment 
for the United States, holding that United States v. Cali-
fornia was controlling and emphasizing that paramount 
rights in the marginal sea and seabed were incidents of 
national sovereignty: 
I 
"As we pointed out in United States v. California, 
the issue in this class of litigation does not turn on 
title or owriership in the conventional sense. Cali-
fornia, like the thirteen original colonies, never ac-
quired ownership in the marginal sea. The claim to 
our three-mile belt was first asserted by the national 
government. Protection and control of the area are 
indeed funptions of national external sovereignty. 
332 U. S. pp. 31-34. The marginal sea is a national, 
not a state concern. National interests, national re-
sponsibilities, national concerns are involved. The· 
problems of commerce, national defense, relations 
with other powers, war and peace focus there. Na-
tional ngh~s must therefore be paramount in that 
area." 339 U. S., at 704.. 
Louisiana had "no stronger claim to ownership of the 
marginal sea than the or'iginaJ 13 Colonies or California 
had," id., at 705; and its claim, like theirs, gave way to 
the overriding rule that "the three-mile belt is in th~ go-
main of the Natjon rather than of the separate State¥,id., J:J 
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at 7. A fortiori, the waters and seabed beyond that limit 
were governed by the same rule. 
In a companion case, United States v. Texas, supra, 
the Court again reaffirmed the holding and rationale of 
United States v. California and again rejected the claims 
of the State based on her historic boundaries and con-
gressional recognition of those boundaries at the time of 
the State's admission to the Union: 
"If the property, whatever it may be, lies seaward 
of low-water mark, its use, disposition, management, 
and control involve national interests and national 
responsibilities. That is the source of national rights 
in it. Such is the rationale of the California decision, 
which we have applied to Louisiana's case. The 
same result must be reached here if 'equal footing' 
with the various States is to be achieved. Unless 
any claim or title which the Republic of Texas had 
to the marginal sea is subordinated to this full para-
mount power of the United States on admission, 
there is or may be in practical effect a subtraction in 
favor of Texas from the national sovereignty of the 
United States. Yet neither the original thirteen 
States (United States v. California, supra, pp. 31-32) 
nor California nor Louisiana enjoys such an advan-
tage." 339 U. S., at 719. 
The Special Master was correct in concluding that these 
cases, unless they are to be overruled, completely dispose 
of the States' claims of ownership in this case. These 
decisions considered and expressly rejected the assertion 
that the original States were entitled to the seabed under 
the three mile marginal sea. They also held that under 
our constitutional arrangement p:aramount rights to the 
lands underlying the marginal sel:t are an incident to na-
tional sovereignty and that their control and disposition 
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in the first instance are the business of the Federal Gov-
ernment rather than the States. 
The States seriously contend that the prior cases, as 
well as the Special Master, were in error in denying that 
the original colonies had substantial rights in the seabed 
prior to independence, and afterwards, by grant. from or 
succession to the sovereignty of the Crown. Given the 
dual basis of the California decision, however, and of 
those that followed it, the States' claims of ownership 
prior to the adoption of the Constitution are not disposi-
tive. Whatever interest the States might have had im-
mediately prior to statehood, the Special Master was 
correct in reading the Court's cases to hold that as a 
matter of "purely leg~tl principle ... the Constitution ... 
allotted to the federal Government jurisdiction over for-
eign commerce, foreign affairs and national defense" and 
that "it necessarily follows as a matter of constitutional 
law, that as attributes to these external sovereign facts, 
the federal government has paramount rights in the mar-
ginal sea." Report, at 23. 
United States v. Texas unmistakably declares this con-
stitutional proposition. There, Texas claimed that prior 
to joining the Union, she was an independent sovereign 
with boundaries extending a substantial distance in the 
Gulf of Mexico-boundaries which Congress had • 
u 1n · recognized when Texas was admitted to the 
Union. In deciding against the State, the Court did not 
reject the prestatehood rights of Texas as it had the rights 
of the t3 original States in the California case. On the 
contrary, the Court was quite willing to "assume that as 
a republic she had not only full sovereignty over the 
mareinal sea but ownership of it, of the land underlying 
it and of all the riches which it held. In other words, we 
assume that it had dominium and imperium in and over 
this belt which the United States now claims." 339• U.S., 
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at 717 Such prior ownership nevertheless did not sur-
vive becoming a member of the Union! weea tlumgh the= 
ltithi is hoami&J its u.f 'Pews h&8 ~@ill recognieiil 8,-
Qa, ~~ urn• 
(IWhen Texas came into the Union, she ceased to 
be an independent nation. She then became a sister 
State on an 'equal footing' with all the other States. 
Th~t act concededly entailed a relinquishment of 
some of her sovereignty. The United States then 
took her place as respects foreign commerce, the 
waging of war, the making of treaties, defense of 
the shores, and the like. In external affairs the 
United States became the sole and exclusive spokes-
man of the Nation. We hold that as an incident to 
the transfer of that sovereignty any claim that Texas 
may have had to the marginal sea was relinquished 
to the United States." 339 U. S., at 717-718. 
The Court stood squarely on the California and Louisiana 
cases for this conclusion; and in our view, the Special 
Master correctly read these authorities, unless they were 
to be overruled in all respects, as foreclosing the present 
efforts of the States to demonstrate error in the Court's 
understanding of history in the California case. 
Assuming the possibility, however, that the Court 
might re-examine the constitutional premise of California 
and similar cases, the Special Master proceeded, with 
admirable diligence and lucidity, to address the historical 
evidence presented by t e ta es and aimed primarily at 
establishing that the Colonies had legitimate claims to the 
marginal sea prior to independence and statehood and 
that the new States never surrendered these rights to the 
Federal Government. The SpeCial Master's ultimate 
conclusion was that the Court's view of our history ex-
pressed in the Califorma case was essentially correct and 
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that if prior cases were open to re-examination, they 
should be reaffirmed m all respects. 
We need not retrace the Special Master's analysis of 
historical evidence, for we are firmly convinced that we 
should not undertake to re-examine the constitutional 
underpinnings of the California case and of those cases 
which followed and explicated the rule that paramount 
rights to the offshore .:eabed inhere in the Federal Gov-
ernment as an mcide of national sovereignty. That 
premise, as we have indicated, has been repeated time 
and agam in the cases. It is also our view, contrary to 
the contentions of the States, that the premise was em-
braced rather than repudiated by Congress in the Sub-
merged Lands Act of 1953. In that legislation, it is true, 
Congress transferred to the States the rights to the sea-
bed underlying the marginal sea; but this transfer was 
in no WISe inconsistent with paramount national power 
but was merely an exercise of that authority. As the 
Special Master said, the Court in its prior cases "did not 
indicate that the federal government by Act of Congress 
might not, as it did by the subsequently enacted Sub-
merged Lands Act, grant to the riparian States rights to 
the resources of the federal area, subject to the reserva-
tion by the federal government of its rights and powers 
of regulation anrl control for purposes of commerce, navi-
gation, national defense, and internatiOnal affairs" 
Report, at 16. The question before the Court in the 
Calijornw case was "whether the state or the Federal 
Government has the paramount right and power to deter-
min(' in the first mstance when, how, and by what agen-
cie:s. foreign or domestic, the oil and othet resources of 
the soil of the marginal sea, known or hereafter discov-
ered , may be exploited." 332 U. S., at 29. The decision 
there was that the National Government had the power 
at issue, the Court declining to speculate that "Congress, 
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which has constitutwnal over government prop-
erty, will execute 1ts power in such a way as to bring 
about injustices to States, their subdivisions, or persons 
acting pursuant to their permission." 332 U. S., at 40. 
The Submerged Lu,nds Act did indeed grant to the 
States dominion over the offshore seabed within the 
limits defined m the Act and released the States from 
any liability to account for any prior income received 
from state leases that had been granted with respect to 
the marginal sea ~ But in further exercise of paramount 
national authority, the Act expressly declared that noth-
ing in the Act 
''shall be deemed to affect in any wise the rights of 
the United States to the natural resources of that 
portion of the subsoil and seabed of the Continental 
Shelf lying seaward and outside of [the marginal 
sea] all of which natural resources appertain to the 
United States. and the jurisdiction and control of 
which by the United States is confirmed." 43 
u.s. c. § 1302. 
This declaratwn by Congress is squarely at odds with /;1 
the assertions of the States in the present case. More- V \ 
over, m the course of litigation dealing with the reach 
and impact of the Act, the Court has said as plainly as 
may be that "the Act concededly did not impair the 
validity of the California, Louisiana and Texas cases, 
which are admittedly applicable to all coastal States .... " 
United States v. Lou,isiana, 363 U. S. 7; see also id., at 83 
n 140. We agree with the Special Maste"" when he said 
that "It is qmtr obvious that Congress could reserve to 
the fede~al government all the rights to the seabed of the 
Continental Shelf beyond the three-mile territorial belt of 
sea (or three leagues in the case of certain Gulf States) 
5 The Submergrd Lando Art \\as held con;;tJtutional in Alabama\ . 
7'exas,347 U 8.272 (1954). 
•'· 
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only upon the basis that it already had the paramount \ 
right to that seabed under the rule laid down in the 
Californ·ia case.'' Report, at 19. 
Congress emphatically implemented its view that the 
United States has paramount rights to the seabed be-
yond the three-mile limit when a few months later it 
enacted the Continental Lands Act of 1953. 43 U. S. C. 
§ 1331 et seq. Section 3 of the Act 
"declared [it] to be the policy of the United States 
that the fo>ubsoil and seabed of the Outer Continental 
Shelf appertain to the United States and are subject 
to its jurisdiction, control and power of disposition 
as provided in this subchapter." 
The Act then proceeds to set out detailed provisions for 
the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction in the area and for 
the leasing and development of the resources of the 
seabed. 
Of course, the defendant States were not parties to 
United States v. California or to the relevant decisions 
and they are not precluded by res adjudicata from liti-
gating the issues decided by those cases. But the doc-
trine of stare dec1:sis is still a powerful force in our juris-
prudence; and alth9ugh on occasion the Court has 
declared-and acted accordingly-that constitutional de-
cisions are open to re-examination, we are convinced that 
th~ doctrine has peculiar force and relevance in the pres-
ent context. It is apparent that in the almost 30 years 
sincP California, a great deal of public and private busi-
ness has been transacted in accordance with those de-
cisions and in accordance with major legislation enacted 
by Congress, a principle purpose of which was to resolve 
the "interminable litigation" arising over the controversy 
of the ownership of the lands underlying the marginal 
sea. See H. R. Rep. 1\o. 215, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 
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tinental Shelf Lands Act which soon followed proceeded 
from the premises established by prior Court decisions 
and provided for the orderly development of offshore re~ 
sources. Smce 1953. when this legislation was enacted, 
33 lease sales have been held, in which 940 leases, embrac-
ing over eight million acres, have been issued. The 
Outer Continental Shelf, since 1953, has yielded over 
three billion barrels of oil, 19 trillion m.c.f. of natural gas, 
13 million long tons of sulfur, and over four million long 
tons of salt. 0 In 19'73 alone, 1,081,000 barrels of oil and 
8.9 billion cubic feet of natural gas have been extracted 
daily from the Outer Continental Shelf. 7 Exploitation of 
our resources offshore implic~:ttes a broad range of federal 
legislation, ranging from the Longshoremen's aDd Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act, incorporated into the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act, to the more recent Coastal 
Zone Management Act. 8 We are quite sure that it would 
be inappropriate to disturb our prior cases, major legisla-
tiOn, and many years of commercial activity 9 by calling 
into question, at this date, the constitutional premise of 
prior decisions. We add only that the Atlantic States, 
by virtue of the California, Louisiana, and Texas cases, as 
well as by reason of the Submerged Lands Act, have been 
on notice of the substantial body of authoritative law, 
o 8. Rc]J . "No . 901140, 9;id Cong., 2d Ses:;; , 4 (1974) . 
'7 ld., at 4. 
g 86 Stat 1281 For a summary of legislation affecting the Outer 
Continental Shelf, see Outt>r Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Develop-
ment and the Coastal Zone, A Report for the Committee on Com-
merce, United States Senate , 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 55-58 (1974). 
u We have long held that the doctrine of stare decisis carries par-
ti<'ular force where the effect of re-examination of a prior rule would 
be to overturn long-accepted commercial practice. See, e. g., 
M'Gruder v. Bank of Washington, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 598, 602 (1824); 
Rock Spring D!Stilltny Co v. W A . Gaines & Co .. 246 U.S. 312, 32() 
(1918) . 
35 Orig -OPINION 
UNITED STATES v. MAINE 13 
both constitutional and statutory, which is squarely at 
odds with claims of theirs to the seabed beyond the three-
mile marginal sea. Neither the -States nor their putative 
lessees have been in the slightest misled. Judgment 
should be entered for the United States. 
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